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The project of this thesis is to examine how an incompatibilist account of freedom 
might work in the absence of a material world and to bring forth the issue of moral 
culpability in light of Leibniz and Berkeley’s neo-theistic God. Issues of the free will of 
man and God’s role in acts of moral evil particularly concerned these philosophers since 
they directly impact issues of moral responsibility. Man’s agency and the problem of 
moral evil are conceived as potentially devastating to their neo-theistic metaphysics since 
they undermine God’s divine attributes in their phenomenalist worlds.  
 
In this thesis, working from an incompatibilist reading of Leibniz, I shall argue 
that his theory of monads cannot be consistently held with human agency. It seems that in 
Leibniz’s case, individuals who perform evil acts are not morally responsible for them, 
what I shall refer to as the problem of human moral culpability. With regards to Berkeley, 
I put forth that God concurs and is as a result, responsible for actualizing evil acts, 
something inconsistent with His divine attributes. Thus, it appears that while human 
beings are responsible for willing morally evil acts, God is also to be held culpable 
because of the nature of Berkeleyan concurrentism. I shall refer to this as the problem of 
divine moral culpability.  
 
I suggest that Leibniz cannot have human agency which he seeks and Berkeley 
cannot consistently retain the notion of God, in their respective metaphysical pictures as 
they stand. Apart from a consistent, workable metaphysic, both would desire to maintain 
the idea that people alone are to be held morally accountable for the acts they commit. I 
shall attempt to dissolve these problems for Leibniz and Berkeley by putting forth the 
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The monotheistic God plays a crucial role in many 18
th
 century Western 
philosophies, George Berkeley’s and Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz’s included. Issues of the 
free will of man and God’s role in acts of moral evil particularly concerned these 
philosophers since they directly impact issues of moral responsibility. These two 
phenomenalist philosophies are not always compared to each other in this context. The 
project of this thesis is to examine how an incompatibilist account of freedom might work 
in the absence of a material world and to bring forth the issue of moral culpability in light 
of Leibniz and Berkeley’s neo-theistic God.  
 
1.1 The God of Berkeley and Leibniz  
 
According to traditional, Western theism, God is a distinct being, the creator of 
the universe, independent of it, eternal and possessed of divine attributes. The prevailing 
consensus among theologians concerning the divine attributes of the theistic God is that 
they include at least the following: omnipotence (God is all-powerful), omniscience (God 
is all-knowing) and omnibenevolence (God is wholly good).  
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For Leibniz, “God, possessing supreme and infinite wisdom, acts in the most 
perfect manner, not only metaphysically, but also morally speaking”.1 Being all good and 
supremely wise, the “author of nature”2, has created the best possible world, of the 
“highest perfection”, “the most perfect order”3, of which could not have been done 
better.
4
 Berkeley has a similar conception, putting forth that the “Author of Nature”5 is a 
“Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness”6, who is omnipresent, just7 and “who fashions, 
regulates, and sustains the whole system of beings”8.   
 
In their various works, Leibniz and Berkeley support the concept of an 
omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God. In this manner, their conceptions of God 
have these traditional features in common with the providential God of traditional theism. 
Both systems are phenomenalist and have God at the core of their metaphysics. Notably, 
however, the God of orthodoxy is predominantly associated with the existence of a 
material world. Given that that both Berkeley and Leibniz’s worlds are non-material 
ones, their respective metaphysics give rise to a God that shares the traditional pan-omni 
properties, but performs distinct functions in light of their respective phenomenalisms. 
Indeed, God is a crucial component of both Berkeley’s and Leibniz’s philosophical 
systems but their God is to be distinguished from the God of orthodoxy for this reason. 


















As such, in this thesis, I refer to the neo-theistic God of Berkeley and Leibniz’s 




1.2 The problem of moral culpability and the problem of moral evil 
 
Leibniz and Berkeley were very much concerned about the free-will of man and 
the problem of moral evil. The opening passage in Leibniz’s Theodicy, puts forth that 
“freedom is deemed necessary, in order that man be deemed guilty and open to 
punishment”.10 In Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley puts forth that in 
order for beings to be held morally responsible, individuals must be genuine agents that 
possess “the use of limited powers…immediately under the direction of their own wills, 
which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions”.11 Both assert that 
morally evil acts should not be attributed to God since humans freely will these evil or 
imperfect events, and this places the entire burden of culpability upon their shoulders.  
Further, both argue that the actions human persons sees as evil are to be considered good 
in the grander scheme of things which we cannot comprehend due to our limitations.
12
 
Leibniz also attempts to avert the problem of evil by arguing that God merely permits, 
but does not will evil.
13
 Man’s agency and the problem of moral evil are conceived as 
potentially devastating to their neo-theistic metaphysics since they undermine God’s 
divine attributes.  
                                                 
9
 Such a distinction addresses the second examiner’s concerns regarding the thesis’ preserving of the 
traditional providential God of Christianity in the face of potential debits by highlighting that this is not the 




 HP, p. 237 
12




It is imperative for both Leibniz’s and Berkeley’s philosophies that God not bear 
any moral responsibility for the acts of moral evil that individuals commit, and that they 
themselves solely bear responsibility for their actions. In this thesis, working from an 
incompatibilist reading of Leibniz, I shall argue that his theory of monads cannot be 
consistently held with human agency. It seems that in Leibniz’s case, individuals who 
perform evil acts are not morally responsible for them. But Leibniz desires to place the 
burden of moral responsibility on human individuals – I shall refer to this here as the 
problem of human moral culpability. With regards to Berkeley, I put forth that God 
concurs and is as a result, responsible for actualizing evil acts, something inconsistent 
with His divine attributes. Thus, it appears that while human beings are responsible for 
willing morally evil acts, God is also to be held culpable because of the nature of 
Berkeleyan concurrentism. I shall refer to this as the problem of divine moral culpability.  
 
I suggest that Leibniz cannot have human agency which he seeks and Berkeley 
cannot consistently retain the notion of God, in their respective metaphysical pictures as 
they stand. Apart from a consistent, workable metaphysic, both would desire to maintain 
the idea that people alone are to be held morally accountable for the acts they commit. 
Human individuals possess free activity of their wills, rendering them morally 
responsible for the acts they perform. I shall attempt to provide solutions to these 
aforementioned critiques of Leibniz and Berkeley with my goal being to propose 




1.3 Summary of the thesis  
 
Following Chapter 1, I begin the thesis proper with Chapter 2, where I introduce 
Leibniz’s metaphysical system. For my purposes here, I shall outline key components of 
Leibniz’s mature metaphysics and their workings. I give a detailed account of the 
Leibnizian monad, the building blocks of the Leibnizian world, discussing their 
characteristics and features such as the hierarchical ranking of created monads, the nature 
of phenomena in the Leibnizian world and the nature of the body. Due to monads being 
windowless, Leibniz also posits a special principle, the Principle of Pre-established 
Harmony, to govern the ‘interaction’ between monads. The Leibnizian world is perhaps 
best described as a sea of monads, where there is no direct causal link between these 
immaterial entities – what there is instead is an orchestrated series of corresponding 
changes. In this chapter, I shall also examine the role of God in Leibniz’s metaphysics.  
 
Turning my attention then to George Berkeley in Chapter 3, I introduce 
Berkeley’s world view and outline a possible problem with it. I begin by briefly 
considering Berkeley’s arguments against the existence of matter and examine the 
components of his immaterial world. Berkeley’s world is an idealist one, purely 
constituted by two kinds of immaterial entities – minds or spirits and ideas. God plays a 
crucial and intimate role in Berkeley’s metaphysical system. God is a divine mind that 
coordinates and sustains the world as we know it. He is ever-present, sustaining and 
coordinating the ideas of sense in all individuals and providing consistency their 
experiences. It is against this distinct role that God has in Berkeley’s world to which I 
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raise an objection. It appears that if God coordinates and sustains ideas for all individuals 
and between all individuals, then He does the same in acts of moral evil as well. As such, 
an inconsistency arises since an omnibenevolent being actualizes acts of moral evil.  
 
In Chapter 4, I present an examination of human agency in both Leibniz and 
Berkeley’s works. I shall begin with an inquiry into the subject of the free activity of the 
will within Leibniz, particularly in light of deterministic elements in his philosophy. In 
particular, I shall briefly look at arguments for compatibilist and incompatibilist readings 
of Leibniz. I proceed to cast doubt on the compatibilist reading of Leibniz and propose 
that for purposes of this thesis, we adopt an incompatibilist reading of Leibniz. Following 
this, I shall examine the activity of the human will in light of the distinct role God has in 
Berkeley’s concurrentist metaphysical picture. Here, God does more than merely agree 
with and allow the actions of individuals to occur. Rather, God participates and brings the 
willed action into actuality, synchronizing the experiences of all individuals involved. My 
purpose here is to locate human agency in a concurrentist world. I also argue further that 
Berkeley was an incompatibilist about freedom.  
 
Next, I turn my attention to seeing both their metaphysical worlds in a 
comparative light. In Chapter 5, I briefly raise some points as discussed in the 
comparisons made by J.J. MacIntosh, Margaret D. Wilson and Laurence Carlin. I also 
highlight textual similarities with regards to Leibniz and Berkeley’s respective 
metaphysics. Leibniz and Berkeley’s philosophies do share similarities and have 
differences. Whilst acknowledging the differences in their metaphysical pictures 
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however, I continue to find that their phenomenalist similarities as well as the 
commonality of the basic idealist entities constituting their respective worlds provide 
grounds for my attempts to borrow from the Leibnizian world in order to aid Berkeley 
against the problem of divine moral culpability.  
 
In Chapter 6, I put forth my critiques of Leibniz and Berkeley. Specifically 
bringing into question the theory of monads, I shall argue that the manner in which 
Leibniz has characterized and described the workings of monads (particularly, human 
souls) as an unfolding of monadic perceptions within an entity, is problematic. In 
essence, if all the monadic perceptions are preprogrammed for every monad, including 
human souls, then it seems that the source of action is not within an agent. Hence, it 
appears that there is no room for free will, and without agency, Leibniz cannot assign 
human individuals moral responsibility. With regards to Berkeley, I put forth that in such 
a concurrentist world, God brings into actuality morally evil acts – something 
inconsistent with his divine attribute of omnibenevolence. A being who is wholly good 
cannot bring into fruition and thereby be culpable for morally evil acts.  
 
In response to the aforementioned critiques I shall attempt to reinstate human 
agency and dissolve the problems of divine and human moral culpability in Leibniz’s and 
Berkeley’s world in Chapters 7 and 8. In Chapter 7, I put forth an altered version of the 
theory of monads. On what I term the tweaked theory of monads, humans possess agency 
since they no longer simply experience the mere unfolding of monadic perceptions, but 
may actually make internal choices and truly be said to act as a result. I shall also address 
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issues regarding the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Predicate-in-notion Principle and 
their place in the tweaked metaphysical system. As a consequence of attempting to 
preserve free will by tweaking the theory of monads and ensuring the contingency 
condition, the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Predicate-in-notion Principle lose 
their fit in the scheme of things. The Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Predicate-in-
notion Principle may be tweaked and adapted to suit the new metaphysical system, but 
they fit poorly as they originally stand. To do so however, is an undertaking beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
In Chapter 8, I argue that the problem of divine moral culpability for Berkeley 
may be dissolved and his immaterialism maintained if one were to adopt the theory of 
monads.  I put forth that Berkeley and Leibniz share very similar immaterial foundational 
entities. As such, I suggest that instead of minds and ideas, one employs monads and 
monadic perceptions instead. Here, my attempts are not to render Berkeley’s philosophy 
indistinguishable from Leibniz’s but rather to maintain Berkeley’s phenomenalism in the 
face of the problem. I find my adoption of the theory of monads is compatible with 
Berkeleyan metaphysics and resolves the problem of divine moral culpability since God 
no longer actualizes acts of moral evil. Finally, I conclude this thesis in Chapter 9, where 










2.1 What is a Monad?  
 
The Leibnizian world is fundamentally constituted by a simple substance Leibniz 
calls a monad.
14
 “Monads are the real atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of 
things”.15 A monad is “nothing but a simple substance, which enters into compounds. By 
‘simple’ what is meant is ‘without parts.’”16 The utter simplicity of a Monad renders it to 
be created or extinguished only by a divine miracle. “To say that Monads are simple is to 
say that they are without parts, and thus immaterial; for Leibniz, anything material 
consists of parts. The simplicity of Monads is also the foundation for their 
indestructibility.”17 In other words, since “it cannot be formed by a combination of parts”, 
                                                 
14
 In my overview of Leibniz’s metaphysical world, I shall begin by focusing on the fundamental building 
block – the monad. I shall work from the assumption that the Leibnizian monads and principles relevant to 
them may be consistently held with Leibniz’s other principles and laws, such as the principle of sufficient 
reason. Admittedly, Leibniz did not introduce the term ‘monad’ till relatively late in his career. However, I 
note that there is widespread consensus in the scholarship that suggest that monads just are basic 
constituents of Leibniz’s world, a world in which principles such as the principle of sufficient reason apply 
(Rescher, p. 23; Ross, p. 73; Mates, p. 154). In support of this, Leibniz made reference to monad-like 
entities in works that pre-date the Monadology. He refers to these entities as “individual substances” in the 
Discourse on Metaphysics and entelechy, soul or spirit in other letters or works (Rescher, p. 18).As such, I 
shall assume in this thesis that Leibniz sees all his formulated principles and laws, including the theory of 
monads, as working harmoniously together. My discussion of Leibniz’s world shall thus be focused on the 






 Jolley, p. 67. “According to an old tradition which Leibniz accepts, destruction consists in the dissolution 
of a thing into its component parts; thus when there are no parts to begin with, there can be no dissolution.”  
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“there is no conceivable way in which a simple substance can come into being [or be 
destroyed] by natural means.”18  
 
According to Leibniz, monads are windowless, they “have no windows, through 
which anything could come in or go out.”19 A corollary of their being windowless is 
“[thus that] neither substance nor accident can come into a Monad from outside.”20 A 
Monad cannot be changed in quality or altered internally by any other created thing
21
, 
“the natural changes of the Monads come from an internal principle, since an external 
cause can have no influence upon their inner being”22 by generating any changes in it, 
since that would involve a transference of quality from one to another. All monads 
possess qualities and it is imperative that they do so since “otherwise they would not even 
be existing”.23 Also, if simple substances did not differ in quality, there would be 
absolutely no means of perceiving any change in things”.24 In addition to possessing 
qualities, Leibniz also puts forth that no two individual Monads share exactly the same 
properties. As he outlined in the theory of the Identity of Indiscernibles, “each Monad 
must be different from every other… [for] in nature there are never two beings which are 
perfectly alike and in which it is not possible to find an internal difference, or at least a 
difference founded upon an intrinsic quality”.25  
  
 
















 M9  
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2.1.1 Entelechies, perception and appetition  
 
Each Monad is endowed with perception and appetition. Monads are endowed 
with perception, which according to Jolley, Leibniz defines as “the expression of the 
many in the one”.26 All monads perceive the universe, however they are able to do so to 
varying degrees of distinctness depending on their hierarchical standing and degree of 
perfection. According to Leibniz, appetition is to be defined as “[the] activity of the 
internal principle which produces change or passage from one perception to another”.27 
Otherwise put, appetition refers to the internal desire or tendency by which a monad 
shifts from one state to the next. It may also be conceived of as a “dynamic principle by 
means of which a monad moves from one perceptual state to its successor”.28 Each and 
every monad is in constant flux, changing from state to state.
29
 Change is a constant 
process though instances of it may not always be apparent to us since “[what] appears to 
us as absence of change is really a very small degree of change”.30 
 
2.1.2 Hierarchy of created monads  
 
All monads possess some degree of appetition and perception, but not all of them 
possess the same degree of consciousness. One may outline three broad categories of 
monads – namely, unconscious, conscious and self-conscious monads. In essence, the 
                                                 
26




 Jolley, p. 68  
29
 M10. Every “created Monad, is subject to change, and further that this change is continuous in each.”  
30
 M10. This is an application of the Law of Continuity, according to this law, “[everything] is continually 
changing, and in every part of this change there is both a permanent and a varying element.”  
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difference between the self-conscious monad and other monads is that the self-conscious 
monad experiences a greater clearness and distinctness of its perceptions and ideas. 
Monads without conscious sensations or feelings and devoid of any memory are 
unconscious monads. Such substances with confused perceptions may be referred to with 
the broader term of entelechies. In contrast, the highest created monads are ones that 
possess memory, conscious and unconscious perception, reason and thought, as well as 
self-consciousness. For these monads, “perception is more distinct”.31 These monads may 
be termed ‘rational souls’ and are the category of which humans belong. The intermediate 
category of conscious monads or souls are reserved for beings (for example, animals) that 
are conscious, but not self-conscious. 
 
2.2 Each monad represents the whole universe  
 
Each individual monad has perception and consequently a particular viewpoint of 
the world. And so, the number of Monads must be infinite: “for otherwise, it would be 
impossible for each portion of matter to express the whole universe.”32 As Leibniz put it,  
 
“And as the same town, looked at from various sides, appears quite 
different and becomes as it were numerous in aspects; even so, as a result 
of the infinite number of simple substances, it is as if there were so many 






different universes, which, nevertheless are nothing but aspects of a single 
universe, according to the special point of view of each Monad.”33  
 
In this manner, the Leibnizian metaphysical world is constituted of a system of monads 
forming an infinite and continuous gradation of perception and appetition, and thus the 
universe is “not only infinitely divisible…but is also actually subdivided without end”.34  
 
A “perpetual living mirror of the universe”35, all individual monads have enfolded 
within themselves, the relations of all other substances – a representation of the entire 
universe. “In a confused way they all strive after the infinite, the whole; but they are 
limited and differentiated through the degrees of their distinct perceptions”.36 Yet 
“although each created Monad represents the whole universe, it represents more distinctly 
the body which specially pertains to it, and of which it is the entelechy; and as this body 
expresses the whole universe through the connexion of all matter in the plenum, the soul 
represents the whole universe in representing this body, which belongs to it in a special 
way”.37 
 
While a being with infinite wisdom could from each and every individual monad 
gain a detailed understanding of all events, past, present or future, in the universe, a 
created being cannot do so.
38
 This is the case since a created soul can only read in itself 














those perceptions which are represented distinctly, it cannot unroll those complexities 
which are enfolded within itself, as an all-powerful being could.
39
 “An omniscient Being 
could see the reality and history of the whole universe within the lowest Monad”, a 




2.3 God in the Leibnizian System  
 
God plays a pivotal role in the Leibnizian metaphysical system. For Leibniz, God 
is not only an “eternally necessary Being whose very idea (or essence) involves existence 
and who is in that way the ground of existence to all other things”, “He is also the 
greatest of beings, the highest of Monads (Monas monadum), whose own existence is one 
among many necessary and eternal truths”.41 According to Leibniz’s formulation for the 
ontological proof of the existence of God, “God alone (or the necessary Being) has this 
prerogative that He must necessarily exist, if He is possible”.42 Thus “God alone is the 
primary unity or original simple substance, of which all created or derivative Monads are 
products and have their birth, so to speak, through continual fulgurations of the Divinity 
from moment to moment”.43  
 
Just as all created beings are monads, God is a monad as well – only that He is an 
uncreated, perfect, self-existent monad, from which all other entities derive their 




 Latta, p. 50 
41








 “If Monads are simple, immaterial, and indestructible, then it is clear that 
Leibniz has arrived at an ontology in which the building blocks of the universe share 
certain properties with God. Leibniz reinforces the thesis that monads, the basic entities, 
are mirrors of God when he tells De Volder that they are all endowed with perception and 
appetite, or appetition.”45 God possesses infinite and supreme power and wisdom, both 
morally and metaphysically.
46
 While He has absolute perfection, created beings may only 
be said to share fractions of that perfection. Created beings derive their perfection from 
God, but are imperfect due to their own nature. As Leibniz put it, “created beings derive 
their perfections from the influence of God, but that their imperfections come from their 
own nature, which is incapable of being without limits”.47 Incapable in the sense that it is 
part of the essence of a created being to be limited. And so “what is limited in us is in 
Him without limits”48 since in all created monads, there are only “imitations” (the grade 
and confusion of which depend on the degree of perfection of the particular monad) of 




                                                 
44
 If this is the case, one might then ask if God (a monad) can be considered ‘windowless’. Monads, 
according to Leibniz cannot influence each other’s inner beings since qualities cannot be transferred in or 
out of a monad (M7). While Leibniz does think that God is a monad, and Leibniz also says that all monads 
are windowless, I find that Leibniz positions God on a different plane being that He is the Divine where 
descriptions of created monads do not always apply to Him. God is supposed to be the omnipotent Creator 
and as such, He must affect other entities and bring them into being. Perhaps then, this feature of the divine 
supercedes and trumps the feature that nothing can ‘go out’ of a monad. This matter may be further 
discussed, but for the purposes of this thesis and since it will not affect my arguments, let us assume that 
God is a monad with some special characteristics (for example, his ‘windowlessness’ and the perfection of 
His perceptions) and that the strict windowlessness criteria that Leibniz outlined best describes the 
interaction between created monads.  
45










 As such in Leibniz’s view, the divine omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent 
entity chose to bring into actuality this world which is the best possible.
50
 The “actual 
existence of the best that wisdom makes known to God is due to this, that His goodness 
makes Him choose it, and His power makes Him produce it”.51 Hence, this metaphysical 
universe is the result not of an indifferent all powerful will, but of an all-powerful will 
that has created a world of the “highest perfection and could not have done better”. 52 
 
2.4 Monads and phenomena  
 
In the Leibnizian world, a ‘material’ body is essentially a compound and 
compounds are “nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simple things”.53 What 
appears to human persons as a finite, continuous, ‘material’ body is actually a set of 
monads, endowed with perception with each having a distinct point of view that falls 
within a certain limit. This set of monads then appears to us phenomenally as a finite 
body with a defined spatial boundary. Every possible point of view within this said limit 
is taken up by or belongs to a monad in that set. Consequently it is due to the perceptions 
of these monads “[constituting] a continuous manifold like the various possible shades of 
colour, e.g., that the set is perceived as a continuously extended and endlessly divisible 
object”.54  
 










 Broad, p. 104 
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Hence, “[body], for Leibniz, is nothing but a collection of Monads (or phenomena 
of Monads)”.55 For Leibniz, there are only “independent substances or collections of 
substances which human beings misperceive as bodies.”56 “[Bodies] are only phenomena, 
though they are phenomena bene fundata.”57 So, what the materialist perceives as a body 
is actually a collection of very confused minds or monads.
58
 More specifically, the 
“living being or animal consists of the dominant monad together with the subordinate 
monads which together constitute the organic machine”59, the dominant monad then 




2.5 Connections between monads – the Principle of Pre-Established Harmony  
 
Given Leibniz’s description of a monad, particularly their being windowless 
entities, one might wonder how souls and bodies relate. But this question is misplaced. 
Metaphysically, all ‘material’ bodies are merely ordered phenomena brought about due to 
the existence of monads. Hence, the question of the connection between the body and the 
soul is more accurately speaking, a question regarding the relation between monads. 
Monads are windowless so a further account or hypothesis of how they interact with each 
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other is required to facilitate the monadic theory. This theory, so conceived by Leibniz, is 
the law of pre-established harmony.  
 
Let us imagine the following scenario: one sighting a white swan in a lake. Given 
that one adopts a theory that includes the human soul perceiving and acting in a world by 
means of a physical body which is animated by the soul, the case is as follows: light from 
the sun bounces off the white swan, travels to the human being, enters its eye, is 
translated by the eye, sent via the optic nerve to the brain and finally, this results in or 
produces the particular visual sensation experienced by the individual.  
 
However, according to Leibniz’s theories, there is no actuality in this. For 
Leibniz, there is no interaction between the set of monads that one perceives as the swan, 
and the set of monads one perceives as one’s body. But neither is there any interaction 
between the set of monads one perceives as one’s body and the dominant monad that is 
one’s soul. “The facts underlying these phenomenally true, but metaphysically 
misleading statements are facts about the correlation of contemporary states of monads in 
accordance with the Pre-Established Harmony.”61 
 
What actually occurs in one’s ‘sighting’ of the swan, according to Leibniz, is the 
relevant sets of monads perceiving, changing through an inner pre-established 
synchronization that is ideal and not material. Since substances are immaterial for 
Leibniz, these substances or monads cannot effect change on each other as a result of 
material causation. One must discard conventional notions of cause and effect which 
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entail physicality. While it seems like they do, monads cannot effect any real change in 
each other. Yet it appears that they do since all changes in monads are prearranged in 
such a way that changes in one are accompanied by corresponding changes in other 
monads.  
 
According to Leibniz, one arrives at the theory of pre-established harmony via 
reason, and not imagination or sense perception. Monads are indeed combinations of 
activity and passivity, but these are strictly confined to the internal, implying an absence 
of physical influence of one monad on another. In his letter to Arnauld, Leibniz likens the 
pre-established harmony of monads to bands of musicians playing perfectly in tune with 
one another. Here, Leibniz says that the concomitance between monads may be likened 
to several different bands of musicians, each playing their parts separately such that they 
do not see or hear one another. They do this while still maintaining a perfect harmony 











                                                 
62
 Latta, p. 47 
 
 20 




3.1 Introducing Berkeley’s world view   
 
3.1.1 Arguments against the existence of matter  
 
The central aim of the Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues 
Between Hylas and Philonous was to advance a novel view of the world in direct 
opposition to the more prevalent one at the time, ‘materialism’. “The view that Berkeley 
rejects is a sort of composite of the views of Locke, of Descartes, of Malebranche, of 
Newton, and of others who collectively were sometimes referred to as ‘the new 
philosophers’.”63 The materialism that Berkeley refers to is the view that there is a real 
material world that exists independently of the mind. On this view, there are actual 
material entities, cars, trees and rocks for example, that exist independent of whether an 
individual is perceiving them.   
 
At this juncture, it is crucial to note that I am not using the term ‘materialism’ in 
the manner it is commonly used today in the philosophy of mind. Also known as 
‘physicalism’ and specifically used in relation to the mind-body problem, this usage of 
‘materialism1’ refers to the view that only the physical exists. Rather, the ‘materialism2’ 
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Berkeley has in mind makes no such conclusion. Berkeley’s ‘materialism2’ maintains that 
both the physical as well as the mental exist. Henceforth in this thesis, when reference is 
made to ‘materialism’ let us refer to ‘materialism2’.  
 
 Non-material entities are not absent from the materialist’s world, the materialist 
does not deny the existence of non-material entities but rather affirms the co-existence of 
both. John Locke provides us with a materialist world view, a particular conception that 
Berkeley was aware of and to which his criticisms were directed. For example, in the 
Lockean physical world, distinctions between primary and secondary qualities are made 
based on Locke’s adoption of Boyle’s corpuscularian hypothesis. For Locke, primary 
qualities of objects are features of actual physical objects that give rise to ideas 
resembling themselves. This is brought about due to the innumerable corpuscles which 
compose the world. Each individual corpuscle has its own size, shape and motion, and 
brings about certain phenomena that an individual experiences. Primary qualities include 
solidity, motion and extension. Secondary qualities on the other hand, are qualities that 
are not a feature of the physical world but are results of the powers of objects to produce 
certain ideas in us. They are qualities that arise when these corpuscles come into contact 
with a perceiver and react in certain manners with that perceiver. Examples of secondary 
qualities include, taste, smell, sound and colour. Hence, unlike primary qualities that 
resemble the corresponding object that produce them, secondary qualities do not 
resemble the powers that produced them.  
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Crucially, in this view of the physical world, there is an actual material realm, 
although the Lockean conception of the physical world does not correspond exactly to the 
manner in which we experience it phenomenally. Berkeley however, refutes the 




In The Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues Between Hylas and 
Philonous, Berkeley targets these said materialists’ conceptions by bringing to light the 
inconsistencies of their beliefs. Like the materialists, Berkeley agrees that the manner in 
which the world is present to us is through various sense perceptions. However, Berkeley 
argues that that is all there is to their existence – there is no need to posit matter or a 
material substratum which holds groups of properties together. As Philonous, Berkeley’s 
mouth-piece in the Three Dialogues put it:    
 
“I see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it: and I am sure nothing cannot be seen, 
or felt, or tasted: it is therefore real. Take away the sensations of softness, 
moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is not a 
being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say is nothing but a congeries 
of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses: which ideas 
are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind, 
because they are observed to attend each other.”65  
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The competing world view Berkeley then advances is a simple and elegant one, a 
view in which the world is composed of only spirits and ideas. “He called himself an 
‘immaterialist’, by which he meant that he (a) denied that what the philosophers and 
scientists were calling ‘matter’ exists at all, (b) affirmed that spirit or mind is the sole 
support of bodily things, and the only cause of their changes.”66 Existence of so-called 
‘material objects’ for Berkeley, as his famous dictum ‘esse is percipi’ conveys, rests in 
the very act of being perceived.     
 
3.1.2 A world of minds and ideas   
 
Berkeley maintained that there are only two sorts of things in the world, minds or 
spirits and their ideas. What are physical objects to Locke for example, Berkeley finds are 
only ideas which do not themselves have an independent existence and can only exist in 
minds. “Ideas are things inactive, and perceived. And Spirits a sort of beings altogether 
different from them”.67 Further, there are also subdivisions amongst these two categories. 
There are two kinds of minds – the Divine mind and the finite minds of individuals. 
There are also two distinct types of ideas – sensory ideas and ideas of the imagination.  
 
Berkeley finds that, of some of his ideas, he can suppose that his own mind is the 
cause. But he cannot do the same for others – namely, ideas of sense. In other words, I 
may find that I have a great amount of control over ideas of my own imagination. For 
example, I may imagine a Ferrari in my front yard. But when I actually look out of my 
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window, I find that I cannot decide what I see. Ideas of sense are not “creatures of my 
will” as ideas of the imagination are for while we can control and will our imaginations, 
“what you and I see, etc., is not determined by any willing, wishing or imagining of ours 
– it is stubbornly there before us; and it is constant in the sense that under certain 
conditions we can perceive it again and again, like the table in one’s room or the road 
outside one’s house”.68 And since “no idea can be the cause of anything, for ideas are 
wholly passive and a cause is necessarily something that acts…[the] ideas which we 
don’t cause must therefore be caused by some other mind”.69 Or As Berkeley put it in 
The Principles, “Thus when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be 
in another mind”.70 From this Berkeley concludes that “[there] is therefore some other 
will or spirit that produces them”.71  
 
In essence, this aforementioned argument which is premised on the idea that God 
is the sustaining force of our world is referred to by Berkeley scholars as the continuity 
argument. “The simplest version starts from the premise that the things we see continue 
to exist when we cease to see them. But the things we see are ideas, and ideas cannot 
exist except in some mind. There must therefore be some other mind wherein they exist 
during the gaps in our awareness of them.”72  
 
The continuity argument is widely accepted by scholars as being an argument for 
the existence of God put forth by Berkeley, and one inextricably tied to the particular 
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immaterialist metaphysical picture he argues for.
73
 Berkeley also achieves this in the 
independence argument. Fundamentally, the independence argument begins from 
observations of certain ‘features’ of the sensible world (or ideas of sense) as well as from 
the fact that neither ideas nor finite minds may be said to have caused such features to 
come about. The argument concludes, based on “the nature of the ideas of sense” that the 
world of sensory ideas exists only because “there is a unique, omnipotent and benevolent 
mind causing those ideas in us”.74  
 
 For Berkeley, one is aware of the existence of God by reflection. As Philonous 
puts it, “[for], all the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting on my own soul, 
heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections. I have, therefore, though not an 
inactive idea, yet in myself some sort of an active thinking image of the Deity. And, 
though I perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him, or know Him by 
reflexion and reasoning”.75  
 
The picture of God painted by Berkeley and conveyed by the aforementioned 
arguments for the existence of God is one where God’s role is not only as Creator and 
Author of Nature, but also of grand coordinator and sustainer.
76
  God plays the vital role 
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of coordinating and sustaining the world as we know it, “[affecting] me every moment 
with all the sensible impressions I perceive”.77 In examining our sensory experience, 
sense perceptions do seem to occur in certain patterns which make it largely predictable – 
such events then appear to operate under certain laws of nature. Berkeley observes that in 
the world, there is “regularity, order and concatenation of natural things… [each part 
works] with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole”.78 Berkeley puts forth 
that nature occurs in such uniform and constant a manner due to God. The “omnipresent 
eternal Mind, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to out view in 
such a manner, and according to such rules… [which are then] by us termed the laws of 
nature”.79 He sustains ideas of sense in us and provides an experience of consistency, 
being the “cause of those regular sequences of ideas that are called reality”.80  
 
In Berkeley’s phenomenalist world, when one ‘eats’ a cherry for example, God 
ensures that one has a cherry-flavoured taste sensation. And ceteris paribus, the next time 
one ‘consumes’ a cherry, a similar experience would be enjoyed. One would not have for 
example, experience the flavour sensations of a pizza instead. “God… is intimately 
present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations, which 
continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short, ‘in 
whom we live, and move, and have our being’.”81 And “He alone it is who ‘upholding all 
things by the word of his power’, maintains that intercourse between spirits, whereby 
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they are able to perceive the existence of each other.”82 The presence of God, for 
Berkeley, permeates all of human experience – even interactions between human minds 
are facilitated by God, guaranteeing regularity and consistency.  
 
In essence, God ensures our phenomenal experience continues as we know it, and 
sustains the external world, albeit one of ideas. What the materialists think of as matter is 
in essence an immaterial idea. They mistakenly think of an object as a material one 
because it is possessed of properties which one thinks must belong to mind-independent 
entities. But such is not the case, and the ‘material entities’ accepted in materialism are in 
fact immaterial ideas sustained by God
83. Indeed, “matter, though it not be perceived by 
us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our 
minds.”84 Crucially, Berkeley found his account advantageous because of its relative 
simplicity. It need not postulate this additional “inert, extended, unperceiving substance, 
which they call matter, to which they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all 
thinking beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the 
eternal mind of the Creator”.85 Berkeley’s metaphysical picture consists of immaterial 
ideas and spirits only – a metaphysical picture that accounts for everything the 
materialist’s theory does and which need not postulate the superfluous entity called 
‘matter’. 
 




 Here, for my purposes I adopt the widely accepted reading of Berkeleyan metaphysics regarding God’s 
role as being one where he places the relevant ideas in our minds and not the view that the ideas we 










4.1 Human agency in Leibniz 
 
Like most of his important doctrines, Leibniz’s views on freedom are developed 
over a host of marginal notes, letters, and published works.
86
 In the Theodicy, Leibniz 
lists three conditions that must obtain for there to be human freedom. “According to the 
formula of his maturity, freedom consists in intelligence, spontaneity, and 
contingency”.87 In Leibniz’s own works, these conditions are to be found in T288: 
 
“I have shown that freedom, according to the definition required in the 
schools of theology, consists in intelligence, which involves a clear 
knowledge of the object of deliberation, in spontaneity, whereby we 
determine ourselves, and in contingency, that is, in the exclusion of logical 
or metaphysical necessity. Intelligence is, as it were, the soul of freedom, 
and the rest is as its body and foundation. The free substance is self-
determining and that according to the motive of good perceived by the 
understanding, which inclines it without necessitating it: and all the 
conditions of freedom are compromised in these few words.”  
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Human beings may be said to possess agency if they fulfill these three criteria or 
conditions in their actions. In this thesis, I shall only refer to individuals who possess 
understanding of the objects in question as agents. That is, I shall assume the first 
condition. By virtue of his metaphysical picture and the role of God, the question of 
human freedom for Leibniz involves reconciling human agency with divine 
foreknowledge and providence. In essence, does Leibniz’s God leave any room for free 
activity of the human will – do we fulfill the conditions of spontaneity and are we able to 
do otherwise?  
  
4.1.1 Conditional Future Contingents – the Dominican-Jesuit Debate 
 
“In the discussion concerning divine providence there were two widely endorsed 
Scholastic views on the truthmakers for such propositions called conditional future 
contingents (CFCs), in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.”88 These “two 
lines of response to this problem…were instrumental in shaping Leibniz’s own stance.”89 
On one hand, the Dominicans put forth that God’s foreknowledge obtains from Him 
being causally involved in the myriad of human actions, what they termed technically as 
‘concurrence’.90 For them, conditional future contingents were determined 
‘postvolitionally’, meaning that CFCs have “as their truthmaker a divine decree”.91 On 
the other hand, the Jesuits put forth that such involvement as that which the Dominicans 
held would eliminate free will. Thus, the Jesuits held that in order for God to “not be the 
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author of sin, his foreknowledge would have to be ‘prevolitional’. They therefore looked 
to define some form of scientia media – middle knowledge – a divine knowledge of pure 
possibles, quite independent of any volitional contribution of God’s own”.92  
 
Leibniz agreed with the Jesuits’ critique of the Dominican view that their concept 
of divine concurrence would rule out free-will and spontaneity and render God culpable 
for human sin since His concurrence (or causal involvement) brings into actuality acts of 
moral evil. However, Begby notes that the “the libertarian model proposed by the Jesuits 
– often paraphrased in terms of a freedom of indifference – fails, on his view, even to 
constitute a coherent view of free will. In particular, it jeopardizes one of the pillars of 
Leibniz’s philosophical system, namely the principle of sufficient reason”.93 The 
principle of sufficient reason states that for every contingent fact there is a reason why 




For Leibniz then, both the Dominicans and the Jesuits fall short of providing a 
plausible account of free human action. The Dominican view is incompatible with 
freedom since it violates the spontaneity condition.
95
 It also accordingly leaves God open 
to problems of evil, since if the particular nature of every event is determined by God’s 
causal contribution, it appears difficult to avoid the conclusion that God is himself a 
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direct and willing accomplice in every evil act that occurs.
96
 The Jesuit view also fails to 




According to Murray, “Leibniz remedied these deficiencies by arguing that God 
knows subjunctive conditionals of freedom in virtue of knowing what dispositions the 
agent had immediately prior to any free choice, dispositions which suffice to ‘determine’ 
the choice ‘infallibly’ while leaving the agent free. In doing so, Leibniz keeps the human 
free act separate from external determining influences while preserving the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason.”98  
 
4.1.2 Leibniz’s compatibilist view of freedom  
 
Predominantly in Leibnizian scholarship, commentators hold that Leibniz 
subscribed to a compatibilist view of human freedom – more precisely, that Leibniz 
thought that every event is determined but people still possess free will.
99
 Most 
prominently, Robert M. Adams asserted that Leibniz was a compatibilist and that he 
maintained this to the end of his life.
100
 A compatibilist interpretation of Leibniz might 
point to the following to support his reading. One might cite Leibniz in the Theodicy, 
where Leibniz seems to put forth that God’s possession of complete foreknowledge is 
indeed consistent with human beings possessing free will. As he put it, “I am of opinion 
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that our will is exempt not only from constraint but also from necessity.”101 The 
Leibnizian world seems a deterministic one, where “[the] foreknowledge of God renders 
all the future certain and determined”.102 And yet, Leibniz simultaneously holds that man 




While “[the] whole future is doubtless determined”104, it is only the case that “the 
will is always more inclined towards the course it adopts, but that it is never bound by 
necessity to adopt it. That it will adopt this course is certain, but it is not necessary.”105 
While there is “a certain inevitability about the operations of the laws of nature”, Leibniz 
did not find that this was metaphysically necessary as his interlocutor suggests.
 106
 The 
laws of nature, according to Leibniz, merely ‘incline without necessitating’. In essence, 
while logical necessitation is incompatible with free will, determination (hypothetical 
necessitation) or ‘determinateness’ is compatible. 107 By highlighting the distinction 
between hypothetical necessity and metaphysical or absolute necessity, Leibniz seeks to 
illustrate that determinism need not impinge on human freedom. As Leibniz put it,  “that 
which is contingent and free remains no less so under the decrees of God than under his 
prevision”, “neither futurition in itself, certain as it is, not the infallible prevision of God, 
nor the predetermination either of causes or of God’s decrees destroys this contingency 
and this freedom.”108  
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4.1.3 Reading Leibniz as an incompatibilist  
 
The predominant opinion of Leibniz scholarship subscribes to the idea that 
Leibniz believes that human freedom is compatible with causal necessity.
109
 However, 
more recently, scholars such as Michael J. Murray, have suggested an incompatibilist 
reading of Leibniz. Incompatibilism is the position that free will and determinism are not 
logically compatible. In his article, “Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future 
Contingents and Human Freedom”, Murray draws attention to the distinction between 
physical and mental compatibilism, arguing that while Leibniz might be a physical 
compatibilist, he denied mental compatibilism.
110
 Murray does not deny that Leibniz may 
be read to be a physical compatibilism or hold that we are free and have causally 
necessitated physical bodies simultaneously.
111
 The compatibilism Murray claims 
Leibniz rejects is mental compatibilism or the view that “the faculties of the human soul 
involved in the free human choice, viz., intellect, will and passions, with their attending 
dispositions, behave in such as way that they causally necessitated our choices”.112 
According to Murray, mental compatibilism is inconsistent with spontaneity since the 
faculties of choice are causally necessitated, hence undermining free will.
113
 As such, 
when it comes to the question of human agency and free will, Murray takes Leibniz to be 
an incompatibilist with regards to freedom.  
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Murray adds support to his claim that Leibniz was not a compatibilist in the 
contemporary understanding of the term, by citing a passage from Leibniz’s Necessary 




“But indeed Free or intelligent Substances have something greater and 
more remarkable, in a certain imitation of God; that they are not bound to 
any certain subordinate Laws of the universe, but act spontaneously from 
their own power alone, as if by a sort of private miracle….And this is true 
inasmuch as no creature is a knower of hearts that can predict with 
certainty what some Mind is going to choose in accordance with the laws 
of nature.”115  
 
It seems here that Leibniz suggests that human freedom is not deterministic but 
that acts of free-will consist in free agents “[interrupting] the connection and course of 
efficient causes operating on their will”.116 As his third condition of freedom, Leibniz 
desires to put forth the idea that individuals possess the ability to do otherwise – this may 
be referred to as the contingency condition. In the Discourse on Metaphysics, he puts 
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forth that “absolutely speaking, the will is in a state of indifference, as opposed to one of 
necessity, and it has the power to do otherwise or even to suspend its action completely; 
these two alternatives are possible and remain so.”117 One might be lead to believe that 
individuals do interrupt certain courses that their will is inclined to, and may readily 
choose to do otherwise.  
 
4.1.4 “The ability to do otherwise” 
 
For Leibniz, a free act is one where the agent exercises reason in choosing the 
best option (this is the first condition of freedom – namely, intelligence). He held that the 
human agent is always determined to will a particular outcome, though such 
determination may not always be by the intellect.
118
 In “Descartes and Leibniz on Human 
Free-Will and the Ability to Do Otherwise”, Wee examines this third condition of 
freedom for Leibniz and finds that a key difficulty for the Leibnizian account of human 
free-will is that it is unclear how the agent could fulfill the contingency requirement for 
freedom. Briefly put, Wee finds that Leibniz’s contingency requirement for free-will 
comes into sharp conflict with Leibniz’s other philosophical commitments such as his 
views concerning God’s nature as well as his spontaneity condition of freedom. Crucially 
for our purposes here, Wee also puts forth that Leibniz’s contingency condition of free-
will comes into conflict with his determinist thesis. Since a free act for Leibniz is one in 
which the agent’s will is determined by what reason suggests is the best choice, it is 
unclear how this act could simultaneously satisfy the requirement that the agent ‘could 
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have done otherwise.’119 “The Leibnizian agent who acts freely certainly would not have 
been ‘able to do otherwise’ in the sense required by the medieval voluntarist, who holds 
that this ability precisely requires that the act is undetermined. In what sense could 
Leibniz then have accorded the human agent an ‘ability to do otherwise’?”120  
 
Leibniz parallels his account of the will and determinism to that of the famous 
saying, “Astra inclinant, non necessitant”. He says that whereas “the event towards 
which the stars tend (to speak with the common herd, as if there was some foundation for 
astrology) does not always come to pass… the course towards which the will is more 
inclined never fails to be adopted.”121 It is one thing to say that the will is inclined 
towards a certain course, but another to say that the will will never fail to adopt that 
particular course to which it is inclined. In the latter, one does not seem to have been able 
to do otherwise. 
 
The ability to do otherwise that Leibniz claims individuals possess does not 
appear to be a genuine, workable avenue for individuals. While on the surface, Leibniz’s 
addressing of the ability to do otherwise does appear to support a compatibilist reading of 
him, a deeper look at it in context however reveals it to be more problematic than helpful. 
And as such, its addition serves to cast doubt on the compatibilist reading.  
 
Wee’s case for Leibniz’s contingency condition of free-will comes as coming into 
conflict with his determinist thesis provides us with a sufficient case for reading Leibniz 
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as an incompatibilist. Murray’s arguments also lend further support to former. It is 
however, not my purpose in this thesis to examine the actual outcome of this and I shall 
defer discussion on the larger argument. While the incompatibilist reading of Leibniz 
does not dominate the scholarship, interesting points and inconsistencies in Leibniz’s 
work have been raised that provide good reason to re-examine Leibniz’s view of 
determinism and free will. In light of this, I shall adopt an incompatibilist reading of 
Leibniz in this thesis for my purposes.  
 
4.2 Human Agency in Berkeley  
 
4.2.1 Divine concurrentism and the human agent 
 
In “Berkeley, Human Agency and Divine Concurrentism”, Jeffrey K. 
McDonough presents an examination of Berkeley’s view of human agency and argues 
that he subscribed to divine concurrentism. “[Concurrentists] maintain that although 
creatures are endowed with genuine causal powers, no creaturely causal power could be 
efficacious in bringing about its appropriate effects without God’s active general 
assistance, or concurrence.”122  God does much more than merely allow the willed 
actions of human persons – He Himself brings about every effect individuals will. When 
referring to divine concurrence with respect to Berkeley, I mean not only that God agrees 
with a particular action and allows for it, but that He is causally involved in bringing it 
about. Given Berkeley’s metaphysics and God’s particular role, one is licensed in 
referring to divine concurrentism in this particular way. Such a treatment is in line with 
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writers such as McDonough.
123
 Henceforth, when referring to divine concurrentism in 
Berkeley’s world, I shall be referring to this specific brand of concurrentism where God 
is causally involved.  
 
According to McDonough, Berkeley’s writings point to the conclusion that he 
himself held what was a default position for many in the early modern and medieval 
periods.
124
 Most notably and explicitly, McDonough cites P145, where Berkeley finds 
that “I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me 
there are certain particular agents like my self, which accompany them, and concur in 
their production”. The concurrentist interpretation of Berkeley, I put forth, is consistent 
with my exposition of Berkeley’s world as outlined in Chapter 3. 
 
Berkeley’s account of moral responsibility and agency is tied to his concurrentist 
views.
125
 On such a reading, Berkeley is able to maintain the distinct role he assigns to 
God in his world, as well as allow for an individual to bear responsibility for his ‘actions’ 
since he willed it freely. For Berkeley, genuine human agency is essential to moral 
responsibility. As stated rather explicitly in Alciphron:  
 
“It should seem, therefore, that, in the ordinary commerce of mankind, 
any person is esteemed accountable simply as he is an agent. And, though 
you should tell me that man is inactive, and that the sensible objects act 
upon him, yet my own experience assures me of the contrary. I know I act, 
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and what I act I am accountable for. And, if this be true, the foundation of 
religion and morality remains unshaken.”126  
 
Here, with Euphranor as his mouth piece, Berkeley argues in favour of human agency 
and accordingly, man’s accountability which forms the very foundation of religion and 
morality. God is a central entity in Berkeley’s enterprise – hence, he requires a robust 
view of human freedom. In Dialogues, Berkeley puts forth that in order for beings to be 
held morally responsible, individuals must be genuine agents that possess “the use of 
limited powers . . . immediately under the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient 
to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions”.127 Berkeley maintains that some of the 
imperfections we experience in the world cannot be morally attributed to God. As 
humans freely will these evil or imperfect events, they instead are to be held morally 
accountable.  
 
For Berkeley, human beings are spirits or active beings, beings that can think, will 
and perceive.
128
 Berkeley seems to put forth that one’s ability to will things is evident 
through intuition and personal experience. In the Principles, Berkeley describes the 
experiences of willing in the imagination: 
 
“I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the 
scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this 
or that idea arises in my fancy: and by the same power it is obliterated, 
                                                 
126
 A, p. 147 
127




and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very 
properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain, and grounded 
on experience.”129  
 
He also describes this same feeling of immediacy in willing when it comes to actions: 
 
“The mind therefore is to be accounted active in its perceptions, so far 
forth as volition is included in them. . . .In plucking this flower, I am 
active, because I do it by the motion of my hand, which was consequent 
upon my volition; so likewise in applying it to my nose….I act too in 
drawing the air through my nose; because my breathing so rather than 




“I never use an instrument to move my finger, because it is . . . an effect 
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Further, in Alciphron, Berkeley insists that   
 
“though you should tell me that man is inactive, and that the sensible 
objects act upon him, yet my own experience assures me of the contrary. I 
know I act . . . and what I act I am accountable for”.132  
 
At this juncture, one might inquire further and ask if individuals are free to will 
what they will? Berkeley’s response to this would be an unequivocal yes. In Alciphron, 
the character Alciphron asks Euphranor if the prescience of God nullifies man’s freedom 
since “[that] which is certainly foreknown will certainly be. And what is certain is 
necessary. And necessary actions cannot be the effect of free-will.”133 Euphranor 
responds this question and broadly to other arguments concerning “such terms 
as…determination, indifference, freedom, necessity, and the like” when it pertains to the 
freedom of man, referring to them as “perplexities and errors” of the doctrine of 
abstraction.
134
 Euphranor or Berkeley’s proposed course of action is to employ a more 
commonsensical approach: 
 
“But, if I take things as they are, and ask any plain untutored man, 
whether he acts or is free in this or that particular action, he readily 
assents, and I as readily believe him from what I find within… I shall 
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make bold to depart from your metaphysical abstracted sense, and appeal 
to the common sense of mankind.”135  
 
Berkeley’s concurrentist metaphysical picture allows for a robust account of 
human agency as well as God’s ever-present involvement in our actions, without 
diminishing human responsibility.  It “allows Berkeley to treat created sprits—including 
ourselves—as genuine, active, secondary causes, rather than as the mere occasional 
causes of God’s lone activity”, thereby making room for human agency.136  
 
4.2.2 Free will and determinism in Berkeley  
 
Compared to Leibniz, Berkeley offers us relatively less discussion on the topic of 
free will. However, while he did not explicitly describe himself as such, I put forth that 
Berkeley’s concurrentism is in support of incompatibilism. Berkeley places much 
emphasis on human agency and free will. The concurrentist God concurs with the choices 
that human beings themselves freely will. Berkeley spills much ink attempting to 
establish that “man is accountable, that he acts, and is self-determined” in order to render 
man morally accountable for his own actions.
137
 As such, in light of his attempts to argue 
for the agency and free will of man, as well as the conspicuous absence of any 
determinist talk, one is inclined to think that Berkeley’s view is an incompatibilist one 
and that he did not think that freedom compatible with determinism.  
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5.1 Introduction and historical timeline 
 
 On the last page of his copy of Berkeley’s Treatise Concerning the Principles of 
Human Knowledge, Leibniz penned the following comments:  
 
“Much here that’s right and agrees with my views. But too paradoxically 
expressed. For we have no need to say that matter is nothing; but it 
suffices to say that it is a phenomenon like the rainbow; and that it is not a 
substance, but a result of substances…The true substances are Monads, or 
Perceivers. But the author ought to have gone on further, namely to 
infinite Monads, constituting all things, and to their preestablished 
harmony. He wrongly, or at least pointlessly, rejects abstract ideas, 
restricts ideas to imaginations, despises the subtleties of arithmetic and 
geometry. He most wrongly rejects the infinite division of the extended, 
even if he is right to reject infinitesimal quantities.”138  
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In part fuelled by Leibniz’s own words, a number of scholars have held that Leibniz and 
Berkeley put forth strikingly similar philosophical views.
139
 Beginning “as early as 1716, 
commentators have associated Leibniz and Berkeley especially because they both 
emphasize the role of perceivers in defining reality and provide seemingly phenomenalist 
descriptions of physical bodies”.140  
 
Their views are similar because both of them endorsed forms of phenomenalism, 
typically understood in the early modern context as a metaphysical view concerning the 
nature of physical objects and characterized by phrases such as “bodies are reducible to 
sets of perceptions” or “esse est percipi”.141 Since it is more relevant to the early modern 
context and as such to my purposes in this work, I shall refer to phenomenalism as the 
view “that nothing exists apart from perceivers and their perceptions (or ‘phenomena’)… 
[as opposed to a] realist, in this context, means someone who believes that there also 
exists a real world underlying our perceptions”.142 In what follows, I shall attempt to 
highlight the points of comparison in Leibniz and Berkeley’s philosophies. My aim is not 
an in-depth comparison itself, but to highlight specific similarities that these 
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Leibniz writes in 1672, “I seem to myself to have discovered that to Exist is 
nothing other than to be Sensed [Sentiri] – to be sensed, however, if not by us, then at 
least by the Author of things, to be sensed by whom is nothing other than to please him, 
or to be Harmonious”.144 One is reminded of Berkeley when one encounters such a 
comment.  
 
In “Leibniz and Berkeley”, J.J. MacIntosh aims to justify the claim that there are 
significant commonalities between the views of the two philosophers in question. He 
notes that “even the most cursory examination shows Berkeley and Leibniz to have held 
strikingly similar philosophical views: they had many of the same motives, they asked the 
same kind of questions, and they came up with very similar answers.”145 A pivotal 
commonality that Leibniz and Berkeley share, one that MacIntosh wishes to draw 
attention to, is that they are both phenomenalists or immaterialists. For MacIntosh, “[the] 
importance of the perceiver and his perceptions, the running together of primary and 
secondary qualities and the denial of their objectivity, and the agreement that God is the 
cause of the perceptions in question without the intervention of matter” are amongst those 
central similarities in the works of Berkeley and Leibniz.
146
 Both Leibniz and Berkeley 
“provide a phenomenalist account of bodies that not only spells out what it means for 
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something to exist but also highlights the need for a doctrine that explains how the 
perceptions of individual perceivers are co-ordinated”.147  
 
According to “both Leibniz and Berkeley, all of creation is orderly, and all things 
are in ‘exact harmony’ and in correspondence with everything else”.148 For the 
phenomenalist then, the following becomes an important question to be answered: How 
might one explain our phenomenal experiences? With a material world and the presence 
of a mechanical system, one would appeal to mechanical causation to explain the 
consistency of our experiences and coherence of events. But if one were to depart from 
the materialist’s conception of the world, this alternative metaphysical picture must be 
able to fill in the explanatory gaps left behind since the materialist’s theories can no 
longer be used to account for certain experiences such as causation, consistency and 
coherence in our phenomenal experiences. How might such crucial features of our 
phenomenal experiences be explained by an immaterialist?   
 
For both Leibniz and Berkeley, the answer is God. And their respective treatments 
of God and the pivotal role He plays in their metaphysics seem quite similar. Leibniz 
writes in the Discourse on Metaphysics, “And God alone (from whom all individuals 
emanate continually and who sees the universe not only as they see it but also entirely 
different from all of them) is the cause of this correspondence of their phenomena and 
makes that which is particular to one of them public to all of them; otherwise, there 
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would be no interconnection.”149 This seems to bear much resemblance to Berkeley’s 
“He alone it is who ‘upholding all things by the word of his power’, maintains that 
intercourse between spirits, whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each 
other.”150  
 
Further, Leibniz also refers to God’s role as that of concurring with our actions 
and being a producer of ideas or sensation in us. He writes as follows:  
 
“In concurring with our actions, God ordinarily does no more than follow 
the laws he has established, that is, he continually conserves and produces 
our being in such a way that thoughts come to us spontaneously or freely 
in the order that the notion pertaining to our individual substance 
contains them, a notion in which they could be foreseen from all 
eternity.”151  
 
One is again reminded of the following from Berkeley:  
 
“It is therefore plain, that nothing can be more evident to anyone that is 
capable of at least reflection, than the existence of God, or a spirit who is 
intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas 
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or sensations, which continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute 
and entire dependence, in short, ‘in whom we live, and move and have our 
being’.”152 
 
Crucially, the common trait of immaterialism that runs through both Leibniz’s and 
Berkeley’s philosophies is inextricably tied to the crucial role that God assumes in both 
metaphysics. For Berkeley, the eternal, omnipresent Mind sustains ideas of sense in us 
and provides an experience of consistency, being the “cause of those regular sequences of 
ideas that are called reality”.153 “According to Leibniz, the divinely pre-established 
harmony of perceivers not only constitutes their identities relative to one another but also 
guarantees the order of the things they perceive. For Berkeley, the co-ordination of 
bodies described by laws of nature reveals the same kind of harmony as Leibniz’s 
postulation of an infinity of monads.”154  
 
Both Berkeley and Leibniz wish to establish regularity in nature in their 
metaphysical systems. But the respective ways in which they go about doing this is a 
point of difference. In Berkeley’s metaphysical system, God guarantees and coordinates 
all features of our phenomenal experience, ensuring “that things may go on in a constant 
uniform manner”.155  
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Notably, the manner in which Leibniz goes about establishing this in his 
metaphysical system leads to an important difference between the two philosophies. This 
“important difference, results from Leibniz’s decision to opt for the notion of pre-
established harmony as a justifiable explanatory tool”.156 MacIntosh highlights Leibniz’s 
awareness that a problem arises for any phenomenalist who has God in his metaphysical 
system as a direct causal agent. Leibniz was wary of occasionalism and having God at 
our “beck and call”. 157 Leibniz has in place in his system then, what he terms “pre-
established harmony”, this is something Berkeley’s system does not possess. This is a 
discrepancy between the two systems that MacIntosh sees as a “disagreement about a 
point of detail rather than about a substantial issue… since it is not at all clear that 




As a direct criticism of MacIntosh’s paper, Margaret D. Wilson, in “The 
Phenomenalisms of Leibniz and Berkeley”, argues that one should reject MacIntosh’s  
“attempts to assimilate Leibniz’s position to Berkeley’s, on the grounds that they both 
think that reality may be fully explicated in terms of perceivers, their wills or appetites, 
and their perceptions or perceptual contents”.159 While not denying that both Leibniz’s 
and Berkeley’s metaphysical views have had some commonalities including both holding 
“in some sense that the physical world is ‘mind-independent’”, she argues that “attempts 
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to assimilate Berkeley’s phenomenalism... to Leibniz’s [would] give insufficient weight 
to certain fundamental and unique features of Berkeley’s philosophical doctrines and 
objectives – features which in fact place him in opposition to [Leibniz]”.160 In other 
words, Wilson argues that MacIntosh only appears to succeed in his endeavour by 
overlooking crucial characteristics of Berkeley’s view which are incompatible with 
Leibniz.    
 
 Wilson puts forth that merely because they may both be considered 
phenomenalists in some way, it does not mean that their phenomenalisms are the same. 
161
 Wilson points out that MacIntosh appears to almost presume a kind of homogeneity 
with regards to the view “phenomenalism” and hence, in doing so ignores pivotal 
characteristics of Berkeley’s brand of phenomenalism which set it in opposition to 
Leibniz’s. Wilson thus sets about re-visiting and highlighting the differences between 
Berkeley’s brand of phenomenalism and Leibniz’s – essentially what MacIntosh has 
failed to do.  
 
According to Wilson, “Berkeley…was centrally concerned to vindicate the reality 
of the world as presented in ordinary sense experience, against the abstractions of the 
philosophers and scientists of his time. Leibniz, on the contrary, agreed to the superior 
reality or objectivity of the physicist’s conception of the world”.162 Essentially for 
Berkeley, esse ist percippi and all that exists is what is perceived or presented in ordinary 
sense perception and that “that perceptions of secondary and of primary qualities equally 
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and adequately present to us the real qualities of bodies (bodies themselves being only 
congeries of sensations)”.163 While sense perceptions are all that constitute the 
experiential world for Berkeley, Leibniz instead “holds that qualities construed by 
physics as ‘real’ are themselves mere phenomena, relative to their monadic 
‘foundations’.”164 “Berkeley was a phenomenalist in the straightforward sense that he 
construed the appearances of ordinary sense experience… He was deeply concerned to 
deny – in the early works, at any rate – that either science or metaphysics reveals truths 
about reality which provide a corrective to ordinary sense experience.”165 Leibniz and 
Berkeley utilize terminology with reference to their respective phenomenalisms 
differently. When Berkeley speaks of perception he means, more specifically, conscious 
awareness of ideas of sense.
166
 On the other hand, as is well known, Leibniz defines the 
term rather mysteriously as “the expression of many things in one” or “that all cases of 
expression in monads are perceptions”.167  
 
In “Leibniz and Berkeley on Teleological Intelligibility”, Laurence Carlin 
highlights this same point, arguing that there are important differences between the 
“phenomenalisms” of Leibniz and Berkeley.168 Carlin argues that “[viewing] Leibniz and 
Berkeley through the lens of final causes, or more specifically through their views about 
intelligible explanation, brings out the basic point that they have had radically different 
conceptions of nature”.169 Their differing phenomenalisms lead also to other substantial 
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differences in their views – for example their regard of nature and its complexity, their 
views on science, their views of infinite divisibility as well as unsensed realities. 
 
“Leibniz emphatically rejects Berkeley’s sensationalism and its accompanying 
view of science, and it is this rejection that lies behind his criticism of Berkeley’s 
“restriction of ideas to imaginations… Berkeley had underestimated nature’s 
complexity.”170 Further, Leibniz subscribed to infinite divisibility while Berkeley did not 
on the basis that “[things] that do not appear to ordinary sensory images do not exist; 
infinite parts do not appear to ordinary sense experience; hence, matter is not infinitely 
divisible since it must be part of a finite mind”.171  
 
5.4 Conclusion  
 
Whilst MacIntosh hopes to establish the crucial commonality of both being 
phenomenalists, he does not deny that there are differences between the two as well. One 
large difference concerns infinity and infinite divisibility.
172
 Another notable difference is 
the workings of their respective phenomenalist metaphysics. However, despite the 
aforementioned two differences in their metaphysical views, MacIntosh still finds that the 
similarities outnumber and outweigh in importance, those differences – especially 
because when they did arrive at differing conclusions, “it was, in one important case at 
least, merely because Leibniz recognized a logical possibility which Berkeley had 
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overlooked”.173 Acknowledging that their views are not carbon copies of each other and 
that “they did not have views which were identical beneath the terminology”, MacIntosh 
puts forth that that the two views are compatible and that Leibniz’s views are logical 
extensions of Berkeley’s.174  
 
Here, neither J.J. MacIntosh nor I suggest that Leibniz and Berkeley’s brands of 
phenomenalism are identical. In fact, as aforementioned, MacIntosh does explicitly point 
out that the exact workings of both brands of phenomenalism do constitute an important 
point of difference that should not be overlooked. What is crucial to note here however, is 
that the metaphysical systems of both Leibniz and Berkeley share the overarching 
commonalities of being phenomenalist and having God play a pivotal role in that 
phenomenalism. “Admittedly, there are differences in the ways that Leibniz and Berkeley 
present their ideas. But that does not mean that they differ substantially regarding their 
fundamental insights.”175 The building blocks or fundamentals of Leibniz’s and 
Berkeley’s metaphysical systems share common characteristics. As such, I find that 
Leibniz and Berkeley are “phenomenalist companions” and we may, as I shall soon put 
forth, look into bringing to bear some portions of their theories to solve difficulties of the 
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Chapter 6: Confronting Leibniz and Berkeley with the 




In this chapter, I shall put forth critiques of Leibniz and Berkeley. Firstly, I shall 
argue that the theory of monads is incompatible with free will in the case of Leibniz 
leaving him faced with the problem of human moral culpability since one can no longer 
hold individuals morally blameworthy. Secondly, I shall argue that Berkeleyan 
concurrentism is confronted with the problem of divine moral culpability, where God is 
responsible for acts of moral evil.  
 
6.1 Critique of Leibniz  
 
6.1.1 Bringing in the theory of monads – where is free will?  
 
The theory of monads is arguably a foundational cornerstone for Leibniz’s mature 
metaphysical picture. The question then is whether there is room for free-will (of the 
incompatibilist sort) given the theory of monads. I put forth that the Leibnizian theory of 
monads leaves no room for the free-will Leibniz so fervently argued for.  
 
 55 
Leibniz did not introduce the term “monad” until much later in his career. In the 
Discourse on Metaphysics published in 1685, the first systematic presentation of his 
metaphysics, he referred to entities called “individual substances”. He continued to use 
this term, sometimes using the term substantial form and entelechy in its stead, or even 
soul or spirit in suitable contexts. Leibniz first began generally using the term monad in 
1969.
177
 The Monadology of 1714 was the first consolidated presentation of his theory of 
monads.   
 
As aforementioned, Leibniz outlines free-will as consisting of intelligence, 
spontaneity and contingency. Here, it is the contingency condition of free-will that is 
being called into question. Since all the monadic perceptions are pre-programmed and 
cannot be altered or changed in quality by any created thing
178
, then it seems that the 
source of action is not within the agent. Such determinism of the will is incompatible 
with freedom. It is unclear how the human soul might go about making a free choice or 
action (even one that is foreknown by God) if all its changing monadic perceptions are a 
pre-planned, unchangeable series where God has pre-programmed all monads internally 
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6.1.2 “The problem should be viewed in light of the Predicate-in-notion Principle, not  
           the theory of monads” 
 
 At this juncture, one might ask if the issue of free-will should be examined in 
light of the Predicate-in-notion Principle and not the theory of monads. The predicate-in-
notion principle is of fundamental importance to Leibniz’s metaphysical system. “Every 
substance has a notion so complete that anyone who fully understood it could infer from 
it all the predicates, down to the minutest detail, which will ever belong to that 
substance.”179 Hence, Caesar crossed the Rubicon and it is part of his essence to do so. If 
Caesar did not cross the Rubicon, then he would not be Caesar. “Every substance has a 
complete notion, and the complete notion of it in some sense contains every fact about it 
down to the very minutest detail of its remotest future history.”180 The only entity that can 
achieve this is God. “Just by glancing at Socrates’ individual concept, God already knows 
exactly how and when Socrates will die…. [He] never needs to infer anything.”181 But 
even beyond this, God has already used his “infinite intellect to construct individual 
concepts of all possible individual substances”.182 Given the predicate-in-notion 
principle, one might question why the free-will problem I have raised is directed towards 
monads and not towards the predicate-in-notion principle. This opponent might say that 
in a world view where both the theory of monads and the predicate-in-notion principle 
apply, monads could be operating under the principle and hence unfold in accordance 
with it. So, Caesar crossed the Rubicon in year X at time X – this is part of his concept. 
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And as such, in year X, the monad that is Caesar’s soul experiences Rubicon-crossing 
monadic perceptions.  
 
Both the theory of monads and the predicate-in-notion principle are closely 
related in Leibniz’s world, but one may examine them separately. Viewing the two 
theories as distinct entities will allow us to more adequately approach and address the 
question of why my critique is directed towards the theory of monads and not at the 
predicate-in-notion principle. My response to this, to borrow a phrase from Leibniz, is 
that the predicate-in-notion principle merely inclines but does not necessitate. When God 
created the best possible world, it included having Caesar cross the Rubicon. But it does 
not follow from the fact that Caesar will choose to cross the Rubicon (since God 
foreknows this), that he does not choose to do so freely. However, when one considers 
the theory of monads and my aforementioned critique of the theory of monads, the issue 
in this case is that there is no room for Caesar to make choices since his experiences are a 
series of unfolding, pre-planned monadic perceptions. As such, I shall focus my efforts 
on the theory of monads instead of the predicate-in-notion principle since I find that it 
presents a greater challenge for freedom of the will.  
 
An inconsistency arises for our incompatibilist Leibniz – his account of free-will 
is inconsistent with his theory of monads. It appears that with the theory of monads, there 
will be no free will and as such, humans bear no moral responsibility for the acts they 
commit. Both monads and free-will are crucial conceptual components in the Leibnizian 
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system that I believe Leibniz would not so easily dispense with. It is my challenge then to 
attempt to preserve as much of both for Leibniz in the chapters to come.  
 
6.1.3 The problem of human moral culpability 
 
Apart from aiding Leibniz in avoiding the free-will problem, I further put forth 
that Leibniz is also faced with the problem of holding human individuals morally 
accountable for their actions. If humans do not possess free will, they do not commit 
morally evil acts freely and hence, are not to be held morally accountable and 
blameworthy for acts of moral evil that they commit. If this is the case then “it appears 
that man is compelled to do the good and evil that he does, and in consequence that he 
deserves therefore neither recompense nor chastisement: thus is the morality of actions 
destroyed and all justice, divine and human, shaken”.183 Leibniz wants to maintain the 
moral culpability of human beings but seems unable to do so in the face of the free-will 
problem. This, I term the problem of human moral culpability for Leibniz.  
 
6.2 Refuting Berkeley’s metaphysical picture  
 
6.2.1 The argument from the problem of moral evil and divine moral culpability 
 
For our purposes here, let us imagine the following scenario. Let us suppose that 
Janice desires to murder a random stranger. The idea that murder is an act of moral evil is 
a rather intuitive one. Legally defined, murder is “[the] crime of unlawful killing…with 




malice afterthought”184 or the “intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm.”185 
Janice walks around her neighbourhood and with a pistol and shoots the first person she 
sees, Tim, in the back. Tim yells in immense pain and collapses, bleeding. How would 
Berkeley explain this occurrence metaphysically?  
 
Berkeley’s concurrentist metaphysical picture relies on God to bring about not 
only the sensory experience of performing the act an individual wills, but also the 
corresponding resultant consequences on the rest of the world, including the giving of the 
relevant sensory experience to other individuals who are involved in the act. Otherwise 
put, our willing something is brought into actuality in the world when God concurs with 
our will. In Berkeley’s world, when Janice wills to pick up the pistol and shoots Tim, 
Janice receives ‘pistol-picking’, ‘trigger-pulling’, ‘gun-recoiling’ sensory ideas. Tim 
receives ‘shot-being-fired’ sound sensation and ‘bullet-piercing-into-back’ sensory ideas 
as well as sensory ideas involving pain and the cessation of all future sensory ideas. 
Berkeley has no recourse to a materialist explanation of events, where a physical human 
entity named Janice wills for a bullet to pierce into Tim’s back by her firing of a pistol, 
and her will to shoot Tim is actualized by her physically taking a real, material pistol, 
pulling the trigger and engaging a series of mechanical processes within the pistol that 
results in the release of a projectile that then plunges it into the back of a real Jack. This 
willing of Janice’s directly results in Tim experiencing real physical pain and possibly 
extinction. Berkeley, however, cannot make reference to such a series of causal events 
since for him there is no actual material world. Without God’s coordination of sensory 
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perceptions and effects between individuals, there is no effectual link between the two 
individuals. In short, without God, Janice would not be able to cause suffering to Tim. 
 
What I put forth is that a problem arises because of God’s unique role in 
Berkeley’s metaphysics. God is supposed to be omnibenevolent and hence cannot partake 
in an evil act. Here one adopts the implicit premise that if an entity is wholly good, this 
entity cannot partake or bring about an evil act. And if this entity does bring about an evil 
act, then it ceases to be wholly good. Berkeley’s concurrentist world view allows for 
individuals to be morally responsible for the ‘actions’ they will since they freely will 
them. However, God also bears responsibility since He directly brings about these acts by 
concurring in them. Otherwise put, God causally brings these acts about. If God’s 
concurring in X, where X is a morally evil act, is the sole reason it is actualized, then it 
seems that God must bear some responsibility for bringing suffering upon an individual. 
Certainly, one is not suggesting that the individual who willed the evil act be absolved of 
moral culpability, but rather one is arguing that in addition to this, God is also morally 
responsible for those evil acts since He actualized it. As such, Berkeley is faced with the 












A key feature of all Leibnizian monads, including human souls, is the pre-
arrangement of their perceptions – the “internal programming… built into their complete 
individual notion… the basis for the state-to-state transition”.186 The criticism against the 
monads that I have previously raised in Chapter 6 arises due to the manner in which the 
monads that are human souls unfold.  The problem arises precisely because monadic 
perceptions seem to be pre-planned and that monads have specific monadic perceptions 
invoked at designated points in time. As such, I find that Leibniz’s theory of monads 
leaves no room for the free activity of the human will. I attempt to retain as much of both 
as Leibniz originally outlined, by proposing a simple tweak to the theory of monads. I put 
forth that the following changes to the theory of monads, the overall formulation of 
which I shall call the tweaked theory of monads, furnishes Leibniz with exactly the 
ability to maintain the monads as well as human free-will. Further, I put forth that the 
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7.1 Tweaking the theory of monads  
 
Essentially, one of the conditions for human freedom as outlined by Leibniz, 
namely ‘contingency’, is not met. If one wishes to preserve free-will in the Leibnizian 
system then one must fulfill all three conditions for human freedom, including the 
contingency condition. What I put forth here is a rejection of Leibniz’s notion that 
monadic perceptions merely unfold in human souls. At the outset, allow me to first make 
a clarification – the amendments to Leibniz’s original theory of monads that I shall 
propose are restricted only to monads that are human souls.  
 
In order to re-establish the individual’s agency, the monadic picture requires the 
inclusion of a mechanism or outlet in which choice may be exercised. Instead of the soul 
experiencing the unfolding of a series of pre-planned perceptions, I put forth that the soul 
be a free monad able to unfold in a number of different ways depending on the 
individual’s choice, fulfilling the contingency condition or the condition that the agent is 
able to do otherwise. By rejecting the idea that all monads including human souls merely 
experience timed monadic perceptions, the source of action will thus be placed back in 
the agent.  
 
Let us say for example that Bill walks in to a supermarket. Let us then assume we 
know that when Bill walks into the supermarket he will desire to steal a loaf of bread. 
This man, Bill, is in reality a conglomerate of monads loosely organized around a higher-
order monad or soul. According to Leibniz’s original theory of monads, what occurs for 
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the human soul is an unfolding of perceptions for that particular monad. As such, the 
scenario above may be described to have transpired in the following manner: the relevant 
soul has the monadic perception of walking into a supermarket, it has perceptions of 
desiring to steal a loaf of bread, then perceptions of taking the bread and leaving the 
supermarket without paying for it. These events or series of monadic perceptions may be 
represented as follows:  
 
Figure 1. Example of a Series of Monadic Perceptions in the Theory of Monads 
 
What I put forth in the tweaked theory of monads is a rejection of a mere 
unfolding of monadic perceptions in the case of human souls. On this view, Bill, 
continues to be a conglomerate of monads loosely organized around a higher-order 
monad. But what differs is that the human soul is a microcosm of choice – meaning that 
at time t1, Bill’s soul may choose to walk into the supermarket or not to walk into the 
supermarket. Let us say that he does walk into the store – this is represented by a at time 
t1. At time t2, Bill’s soul may choose to take a loaf of bread (b1) or not to take the loaf of 
bread (b2). He chooses to take a loaf of bread and has the corresponding monadic 
perception b1. At time t3, he may choose to pay for the loaf of bread at the cashier (c1) or 
not to pay for the loaf of bread at the cashier (c2). He chooses to hide it and has monadic 
perception c2. At time t4, Bill may choose to remain in the supermarket (d1) or leave the 
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supermarket (d2). Bill chooses to leave with the bread he has not paid for and has 
corresponding monadic perception d2.
187





Figure 2. Example of a Series of Monadic Perceptions in the Tweaked Theory of Monads 
Instead of the mere unfolding of monadic perceptions, as in the case of the theory 
of monads, in the tweaked theory of monads, the human soul makes choices and thus 
fulfills the contingency requirement for freedom (or the ability to do otherwise) that 
Leibniz outlined. While in the original theory, souls do not seem able to do otherwise 
than they are programmed to do, what one suggests here instead is that each human soul 
may do so and hence be said to freely will.  
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 This series of monadic perceptions is a simplified example. A complete account of these events would 
include a vast number of monadic perceptions, since the transition from one monadic perception to another 
is almost indistinguishable due to the minute nature of individual changes. Here, I am merely highlighting 
some crucial moments and individual monadic perceptions for the purposes of this discussion.   
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I propose that each human soul is a ‘microcosm of choice’, where such choices 
the monads make have no direct, physical effect on other monads. Rather, as the law of 
pre-established harmony dictates, other monads merely unfold in a manner compatible 
and synchronized with the choices the human soul makes – mirroring an effect in the 
‘physical’ understanding of the term. Crucially, laws that govern the interaction between 
monads continue to apply in the tweaked theory. Other characteristics regarding monads 
also continue to be maintained in the tweaked theory of monads. All monads continue to 
be windowless, immaterial and indestructible. Also, the monadic hierarchy is also 
maintained, with the additional feature than the highest form of monads, the soul, not 
only has the clearest perceptions but in addition is also capable of choice. 
 
Let us assume that all of Bill’s choices, to walk into the supermarket, to take a 
loaf of bread and then to leave without paying are choice not made under duress. Let us 
say for example, that Bill notices that this supermarket has poor security measures and 
that it will be more advantageous to him to simply take the bread without paying for it 
than it will be to pay. In other words, Bill was not for example, unable to pay and in need 
of feeding his three starving children and thus driven by passion.  Bill reasons that in this 
case he can easily, in a manner of speaking, have his bread and eat it too.  
 
As such, the human soul is endowed with the ability to exercise its agency. One 
might ask then, how this tweaked conception of the human soul may cohere with the 
other characteristics of the monads and laws governing their interaction that Leibniz has 
outlined. Certainly, if the change I have proposed requires subsequent changes to other 
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facets of the system of monads then one has to outline new features, such as laws that 
govern interactions between monads. However, I put forth that proposing this additional 
feature in human souls does not require any further tweaks in the relevant laws governing 
or features of any other monad. All corresponding changes in the world arise in a 
synchronized manner due to the law of pre-established harmony.  
 
In the alternative theory of monads, when bringing the best possible world into 
being, God has already foreknown all the choices of all individuals ever in existence will 
make. Grounded in God’s foreknowledge, the law of pre-established harmony continues 
to perform its function in the tweaked theory. The law of pre-established harmony 
performs the function of coordinating windowless, immaterial monads, and dictates that 
all changes in a monad are synchronized with relevant changes in all other monads. Since 
God foreknows all the individuals, relevant choices and events to be found in the best 
possible world, all monads including souls could then be accordingly coordinated. With 
regards to the workings of the metaphysical system, for example the interactions between 
monads, one need not amend these to cohere with the amended concept of the human 
soul. The addition of human souls making choices instead of having monadic perceptions 
merely being unfolded for them has deep implications for the ability to do otherwise but 
does not undermine the principles according to which monads interact.  
 
Therefore, with the tweaked theory of monads, one arrives at a situation where 
God may possess foreknowledge of all events that will occur and yet there is the ability to 
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do otherwise and hence, there is free will and choice. Human souls do indeed make real 
choices at each moment, choices that God has foreknown and has decided to bring into 
being in this best possible world. Human freedom as well as the theory of monads (to a 
very large extent) has both been preserved. Further, I also propose that the adoption of 
the tweaked theory of monads, since it safeguards human freedom, would also aid 
Leibniz in avoiding the problem of human moral culpability.  
 
The proposed tweaked theory of monads does not compromise Leibniz’s vision of 
a neo-theistic, immaterial, monadic world. However, as a consequence of attempting to 
preserve free will by tweaking the theory of monads and ensuring the contingency 
condition, the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Predicate-in-notion Principle as 
originally formulated, lose their fit.
188
 With respect to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, 
“if the choice of the will is not determined or brought about by antecedent conditions 
prior to the act of willing, then the requirement that that choice must have occurred for a 
sufficient reason would be violated”.189 Pertaining to the Predicate-in-notion Principle, 
since acts of will are undetermined, substances do not have complete notions from which 
one can infer all its predicates. The contingency condition (or ability to do otherwise) is 
logically incompatible with these principles, giving rise to what Wee terms a “genuine 
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Predicate-in-notion Principle given the potentially problematic nature of such a move for his neo-theistic 
God.  
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irreconcilability”.190 According to Wee, Leibniz does not have recourse to claim that such 
logical incompatibilities arise due to our finite minds being unable to grasp the relevant 
metaphysical aspects, unlike Descartes has for example.
191
 These principles thus come 
into direct conflict with “any robust ascription of the ability to do otherwise”.192 In light 
of this, the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Predicate-in-notion Principle may be 
tweaked and adapted to suit the new metaphysical system, but they fit poorly as they 
originally stand. I shall defer on such an undertaking however, since it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
7.2 Sin and circumventing the problem of human moral culpability  
 
With the tweaked theory of monads however, one has argued that human beings 
do indeed have free-will and exercise their agency by making choices. If there is no free 
will, then human persons cannot be held responsible for acts of moral evil, as Leibniz 
desires. By allowing for human souls to make choices, the tweaked theory of monads and 
the changes proposed aid Leibniz in resolving the problem of human culpability since 
“[vice] and crime… arise there through the free inward operation of the creature”.193 
Leibniz may then hold the human person morally accountable for his or her actions.  
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At this juncture, one might ask us to turn our attention to Leibniz’s account of 
sin.
194
 For Leibniz, human beings commit sin because they are created creatures with 
limitations.
195
 The human being and any other created monad are entities whose “essence 
it is to have limits”.196 Given Leibniz’s account of moral evil as arising from a limitation 
in the essence of the human soul, can human beings still bear moral responsibility for 
moral evil since it appears that Man is created in a manner that he is “liable to fall”?197 In 
light of this, it seems that God is to bear at least some moral responsibility. Can the 
problem of human moral culpability still be avoided by a change in the theory of 
monads? I find that despite Leibniz’s account of sin, the problem of human moral 
culpability may still be circumvented.  
 
According to Leibniz, the human soul, though it is the highest entity in the 
monadic hierarchy and thus has the clearest monadic perceptions as well as the ability to 
choose, is not without limitations. On Leibniz’s view, God possesses “absolutely infinite 
or perfect” attributes, whereas in “the created Monads or the Entelechies there are only 
imitations of these attributes, according to the degree of perfection of the Monad.”198 
“[What] is limited in us [then,] is in Him without limits”.199 Indeed, “[were] the soul 
completely without limitations, it would be God”.200  
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For every decision or choice a soul makes, whether to commit any act including 
those of moral evil, the soul may select between possible scenarios and chooses a 
particular one using its intelligence or reasoning. “[The] soul spontaneously strives to 
realize a particular state of affairs from among several it presents as abstract possibilities, 
having used its advanced powers of reasoning to judge this course of action to be in its 
best interest.”201 Though no individual will ever freely will evil for itself, it is because it 
has limitations in its reasoning that it is sometimes directed towards what is only 
apparently good.
202
 But “the apparent good it aims for does not always coincide with 
[the] true good” “consequently “it can deceive itself and commit other errors,” with the 
results often being “detrimental to itself”.203  
 
Given this limitation of human souls, are individuals still to be held morally 
responsible – should the burden of responsibility not fall on God?  “When the sinful soul 
complains that limitations in its original nature cause it fall into sin, it must be 
remembered that, while the human soul is limited in many ways, it still has the freedom 
to make choices and pursue its own good.”204 Otherwise put, when the human soul acts or 
makes a choice that is morally evil, it does so fulfilling the spontaneity, contingency and 
intelligence criteria set out by Leibniz. Since they are free, human individuals are morally 
responsible for their actions.   
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8.1 Berkeley’s problem  
 
Berkeley casts aside the material worlds of Descartes and Locke in favour of one 
where God is intimately present. For Berkeley, God sustains and coordinates all sensory 
ideas in each and every instance of natural occurrence or human action. God also 
performs this same function even in cases of moral and natural evil. God is thus causally 
responsible for acts of moral evil. But God is supposed to be omnibenevolent and as 
such, having a part to play in an evil act is inconsistent with His divine attribute. One 
assumes here the implicit premise that if an entity is wholly good, it cannot bring about or 
partake in an evil act. And if this entity does bring about or partake in an evil act, then it 
ceases to be wholly good. Therefore, I put forth that an inconsistency arises for Berkeley 
– the role Berkeley assigns God puts Him in a position where He brings about morally 
evil acts and is thus morally responsible for them, a violation of one of His divine 
attributes. Berkeley’s metaphysical picture depends on the neo-theistic conception of 
God, where God is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, but bringing into 
fruition morally evil acts seems antithetical to His very being.  
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In light of the problem of divine moral culpability, I find that Berkeley’s 
metaphysical picture beckons to be altered at the very least if it is to be retained. In order 
to retain world view, Berkeley has two alternatives to choose from. Firstly, Berkeley 
could maintain his brand of immaterialism wholesale and put forth that God is not wholly 
good. Secondly, Berkeley could maintain the conception of God with the three pan-omni 
qualities and alter his immaterialist picture such that God does not coordinate or sustain 
acts of moral evil. Here, I propose to undertake the latter.  
 
8.2 Looking to a fellow phenomenalist  
 
In his own copy of the Principles of Human Knowledge, Leibniz penned that 
Berkeley should have gone further to the infinity of monads. As put forth in Chapter 4, 
Berkeley’s and Leibniz’s metaphysics share crucial similarities. They both expound 
phenomenalist philosophies and have the neo-theistic God holding prominent positions in 
their metaphysics. Berkeley’s metaphysical picture sees God as an intimately present 
sustainer and coordinator. Leibniz’s world view on the other hand, sees God as the divine 
architect and law giver who is ever-present though not involved in moment to moment 
concurrentism as Berkeley’s God is. It is this difference that could provide the basis for 
allowing Berkeley to alter his brand of immaterialism, thereby avoiding the problem of 
moral culpability and retaining both his phenomenalist stance as well as the intimate and 
crucial role that God plays in his metaphysical picture. I put forth that one bring to bear 
the tweaked theory of monads in Berkeley’s philosophy because it coheres well with 
Berkeleyan metaphysics. 
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Further, I also put forth that they share in the fundamental constituent entities of 
their respective metaphysical worlds and it is this commonality which I would like to 
explore and exploit in order to aid Berkeley in avoiding the problem of divine moral 
culpability. My aim here is not to argue that Berkeley should have arrived at all the same 
conclusions as Leibniz. Rather, I aim to preserve as much of Berkeley’s original theory as 
possible to render it distinct from Leibniz. I shall attempt to do this by the tweaked theory 
of monads when bringing it to bear on Berkeley’s so one is still able to maintain that the 
resultant world view is Berkeleyan, not Leibnizian.  
 
 Berkeley’s world is populated by only two entities – minds or spirits and ideas. 
“This perceiving active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul or my self”.205 “A spirit is 
one simple, undivided, active being: as it perceives ideas, it is called the understanding, 
and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the will.”206 And “the will 
is termed the motion of the soul”.207 Like a monad which is a human soul for Leibniz, 
Berkeley’s spirit or mind is an active, dynamic entity with “power or agency” and will.208 
Further, like Leibniz, Berkeley regards “the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, 
and… consequently incorruptible”.209 As he put it, “[nothing] can be plainer, than that the 
motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural bodies 
(and which is what we mean by the course of nature) cannot possibly affect an active, 












simple, uncompounded substance: such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of 
nature, that is to say, the soul of the man is naturally immortal.”210  
 
In this manner, there are marked similarities between Berkeley’s and Leibniz’s 
account of the human soul. Given these similarities, I put forth that one is warranted in 
adopting the Leibnizian conception of a monad and bringing it to bear in Berkeley’s 
world. In speaking of monads and monadic perceptions, rather than spirits and ideas, one 
is not adding anything additional to Berkeley’s discourse. These basic constituents of the 
immaterial worlds are similar and provide us with a common denominator. The account 
of interaction between monads or spirits then will be the point of difference and the 
contributing factor to the problem of divine moral culpabilty. In other words, I propose 
that the account of how interactions between human souls take place or how morally evil 
acts are actualized requires alteration. For this purpose, I will borrow the term monads 
and the law of pre-established harmony (which I will modify for Berkeley’s purposes) 
from Leibniz – what is to a large part, the tweaked theory of monads.  
 
For Leibniz, the world is a sea of monads. Even what is perceived as the ‘human 
body’ is a loosely grouped set of monads. This is a notion that conflicts with Berkeley’s 
view that the world is populated only by minds and ideas and that the ‘body’ is nothing 
but a series of ideas to a specific mind. As such, I shall leave out this component of 
Leibniz’s philosophy when adapting the theory of monads for Berkeley’s metaphysical 
picture since I desire to keep Berkeley’s philosophy as Berkeleyan as possible. My aim 
here is to borrow from Leibniz to aid Berkeley, not render Berkeley’s view completely 




Leibnizian. Hence, the addition of this would be detrimental since it is a notion that is 
contradictory to one of Berkeley’s fundamental notions. 
 
Borrowing from the theory of monads, I put forth that one replaces minds and 
ideas with monads (human souls) and monadic perceptions. Here, one is not only 
borrowing the terminology from Leibniz, but also incorporating the concepts of monads 
and monadic perceptions are the distinct manner in which they operate. What one 
attempts to do here is shift God’s role from a sustainer and coordinator, to a lawgiver or 
architect.  If God does not sustain acts of moral evil as per the original Berkeleyan 
formulation, then He is not to be held morally responsible for them and hence, the 
problem of moral evil outlined is dissolved. Human agents are to be held solely 
accountable for the evil that they do. 
 
The alternative account one proposes then, borrowing from the theory of monads 
is this: In the case of Janice shooting Tim, Janice, what is essentially a monad or human 
soul, wills to shoot Tim, another monad or human soul. Her willing such an act is 
followed by her experiencing the monadic perception of pulling the trigger. The monad 
Tim, then experiences the monadic perceptions including bullet-piercing sensations, 
sensations of pain, and extinction.
211
 But how does Janice’s willing to shoot Tim, her 
receiving all the relevant monadic perceptions of sensations, and Tim’s receiving of all 
his relevant monadic perceptions of being shot all occur as if in a cause and effect series 
if God does not directly coordinate them? For monads are windowless, and hence cannot 
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name Janice, for example, is thus a ‘convenient designator’ for a specific human soul that is a dominant monad.   
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be affected by any created thing. Here, as Leibniz has, one looks to the law of pre-
established harmony.  
 
At this juncture, one might question whether the law of pre-established harmony 
is compatible with Berkeley’s metaphysics. Indeed, Leibniz’s metaphysical system is one 
of tight-knit, interdependent concepts – so, borrowing of the concept of monads and the 
law of pre-established harmony might necessitate one in adopting other arguments 
Leibniz has made. More specifically, it might require one to agree with Leibniz regarding 
God’s foreknowledge when He created the world and further that this world is the best 
possible one that God could have created.  
 
For Berkeley, even what we consider ills in this world – things such as miseries 
endemic to human life – are “indispensably necessary to our well-being”.212 These so-
called evils, Berkeley finds, only appear to be evil since they actually have to nature of 
good, when one considers them in the grander scale of the system of beings.
213
 Given that 
God is omnibenevolent, it is hard to imagine that Berkeley would disagree that this is the 
best possible world. A wholly good being cannot consistently bring into being a world 
that is not the best possible one – doing so would only leave Berkeley with the problem 
of evil and problem of divine moral culpability, the very problem one is trying to avoid 
on his behalf.  
 






That this is the best possible world might not be measured through individual 
experiences but by taking stock of all individuals ever in existence and this is something 
only known by God. Berkeley does put forth this notion himself, saying that it is “the 
nature of [the] infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite”.214 The question of 
whether God considered all the possible worlds He could have brought into being prior to 
creation might also be raised. For Berkeley, “God is a Being of transcendent and 
unlimited perfections: His nature, therefore, is incomprehensible to finite spirits. It is not, 
therefore, to be expected, that any man, whether Materialist or Immaterialist, should have 
exactly just notions of the Deity, His attributes, and ways of operation”.215 I find that this 
is not problematic for Berkeley since it is part of divine foreknowledge and of God’s 
omniscience that He should be able to see all future happenings in a manner that we 
cannot. This world is created by God, who is a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness.
216
 
It seems then that God could not bring about a world that was not the best possible one. 
As such, Berkeley would not have much problem accepting that God possess 
foreknowledge as part of his omniscience and that He chose to create the best possible 
world since it coheres very much with the conception of God he outlines.  
 
8.3 Addressing the problem of divine moral culpability   
 
At this juncture, one might ask how altering Berkeley’s brand of phenomenalist 
metaphysics allows one to avoid the problem of divine moral culpability.  If it is the case 
that Leibniz’s God should be morally culpable in the same manner as Berkeley’s then one 
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does not have an argument for proposing the tweaked theory of monads be adapted for 
Berkeley’s purposes. To address this, let us consider the act of Peter stabbing Jodie in 
three metaphysically different worlds. Let us say that Peter decides to stab Jodie in the 
back with a knife. I shall first describe this event in terms of the original Berkeleyan 
metaphysics, then I shall do the same in terms of the materialist understanding and then 
lastly in the modified Berkeleyan world view that I have advanced, one which integrates 
the tweaked theory of monads.  
 
In Berkeley’s original formulation of a phenomenalist world, the stabbing might 
be explained in the following manner: Peter, wills to stab Jodie, God, the grand 
coordinator and sustainer, brings this action into actuality by providing Peter with knife-
picking, knife-stabbing-into-Jodie’s-back sensations, while at the mean time providing 
Jodie with stabbing and pain perceptions. While God did not will the act of stabbing 
Jodie, He did sustain and coordinate all relevant perceptions that amount to Jodie’s 
stabbing. Without God, this stabbing would not occur. God’s solely actualizing the 
stabbing is tantamount to God committing the stabbing. Here, I do not put forth that Peter 
is absolved of moral responsibility since he did not commit the act itself in the 
Berkeleyan world. Rather, I am further arguing that God does bear moral responsibility 
for the act as well, on the grounds that He essentially committed the morally evil act by 
bringing it into fruition in this particularly Berkeleyan manner.  
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In a non-phenomenalist, material world, the stabbing is to be explained in a 
different manner.
217
 Peter, who wills to stab Jodie, picks up a physical knife with his 
material hands and plunges it into the back of the real, material body of Jodie, who feels 
immense pain as a result of physical processes. Perhaps one might ask where God is in all 
this and whether He is morally accountable for this evil act that befalls Jodie. Indeed, 
God has chosen to create a world where amongst the many events that occur, the event of 
Jodie getting stabbed occurs as well. But God did not will to stab Jodie, as Peter did. And 
neither did He commit what is essentially the morally evil act, as the Berkeleyan God did.  
 
In the revised Berkeleyan world I have proposed, what occurs in the same events 
is this: the monad ‘Peter’ wills freely to ‘stab’ Jodie. The law of pre-established harmony 
then sees the relevant perceptions experienced by each monad – perceptions of stabbing 
for the monad ‘Peter’ and perceptions of pain are experienced by the monad ‘Jodie’. 
Here, in this phenomenalist world, one manages to avoid the problems of the original 
Berkeleyan metaphysics, one where God is morally accountable for the stabbing because 
of His direct involvement. Here, God did not will the act, and He did not commit or 
causally bring it into actuality. As such, one is no longer faced with the problem of divine 
moral culpability.  
 
When entity Y commits an act of moral evil X, I put forth that moral culpability 
may be ascribed if either or both of the following criteria is fulfilled: firstly, that Y wills 
for X to occur, and secondly, that there is Y’s direct involvement or action to bring about 
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facets of the world constant with Berkeley’s, save for the phenomenalist aspect of his metaphysics.  
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X. Indeed, Peter wills that Jodie be stabbed, but does God do the same? Does God will X 
in the same way that a murderer desires to kills his victim? The answer is no. As it is in 
the case of the original Berkeleyan world, God does not will the stabbing of Jodie in this 
way. According to Berkeley, such a direction of will belongs entirely to Peter and may 
not be attributed to God.
218
 One might attempt to argue that God does in fact will the 
stabbing, albeit indirectly, by willing and bringing this world into actuality, a world 
where Jodie will be stabbed. However, foreknowledge of all events and bringing such a 
world into being cannot be equated with willing any particular act in that series.  
 
Indeed, it appears problematic that God chose a world where the stabbing would 
happen. Yet, it is a world where human individuals are possessed of free will and choose 
to act in certain ways. When choosing which world to bring into being, God foreknew all 
events that would occur if He brought this particular world into being, but He did not 
direct Peter’s will, Peter did this freely and hence, God did not will that Peter stab Jodie. 
Though God allowed for such a stabbing to occur, He still did not will it.  
 
Essentially, what one should be concerned with here is the second condition of 
divine moral culpability – namely, God’s direct involvement in bringing about a morally 
evil act. And it is with this that the original Berkeleyan metaphysics is confronted, a 
problem that the materialist conception manages to avoid. The new formulation of 
Berkeley’s metaphysics is advantageous because it avoids the problem of divine moral 
culpability by not having God involved in such a problematic manner, while also 
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 HP, p. 82; all actions are produced “immediately under the direction of their own wills, which is 
sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions”. 
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avoiding the materialist conclusion. The modified Berkeleyan metaphysics that integrates 
Leibniz’s tweaked theory of monads allows Berkeley to retain the phenomenalist nature 
of his metaphysics.  
 
8.4 Objections and counter-arguments  
 
Let us now consider two criticisms an opponent might potentially raise.  
 
8.4.1 Does Berkeley cease to be a phenomenalist?  
 
One might raise the point of whether Berkeley continues to be a phenomenalist 






What I have proposed to in light of the problem of divine moral culpability is to 
replace Berkeley’s particular method of God actualizing particular acts with an adapted 
version of the tweaked theory of monads. In order to tailor the theory to suit Berkeleyan 
metaphysics, I have left out the notion of the body as a loosely grouped set of monads. 
While there is room for a ‘body’ in Leibniz’s metaphysics, Berkeley’s world only 
consists of ideas and minds or souls. Bodies again, are mere perceptions in one’s mind or 
of a monad and not a loosely grouped set of monads.   
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 This is a critique proposed by the second examiner in response to an earlier incarnation of this thesis.  
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Phenomenalism may be defined as the view that physical objects are to be 
reduced to sets of sensory perceptions.
220
 In direct contrast with this is the view termed 
materialism, which asserts the opposite – namely that there is a real material world 
independent of the mind. With the proposed changes to Berkeleyan metaphysics, 
although the manner in which perceptions are coordinated is altered, the basic 
constituents of the Berkeleyan world remain the same – they continue to be populated by 
minds and ideas only. The basic tenet of phenomenalism, the idea that physical objects 
are to be reducible to sensory perceptions, is still maintained. The Berkeleyan world has 
not been turned into a materialist world for example. Admittedly, the brand of 
phenomenalism may not be strictly that which Berkeley originally conceived, but 
nonetheless the altered Berkeleyan metaphysics that I have put forth continues to be a 
phenomenalist one. 
 
8.4.2 The objection from moral evil  
 
One might ask if my proposed treatment truly resolves the problem of moral evil 
and absolves God of moral culpability since even in this proposed world God continues 
to allow moral evil to befall individuals, even if He does not concur with evil acts 
directly. Otherwise put, since we are replacing Berkeley’s direct interventionist God, with 
one where God’s activity in the world is not directly interventionist, is the former 
superior to the latter in its ability to absolve God from moral responsibility?  
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In his works, Berkeley has responded to the wider problem of evil – the question 
of how we are to reconcile God with the evils evident in this world or how God can allow 
evil acts to occur. For example in the Principles, Berkeley puts forth that if we “enlarge 
our view… we shall be forced to acknowledge that those particular things, which 
considered in themselves to be evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked 
with the whole system of beings.”221 Further, Berkeley also argues that individuals 
possess free will and may choose to use these limited powers “immediately under the 
direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their 
actions”.222  
 
What I find is particularly pressing for Berkeley is that God directly participates 
in and actualizes acts of moral evil – a direct result of Berkeley’s brand of concurrentist 
metaphysics. And this is a critique to which Berkeley does not respond, despite it being a 
crucial problem arising from his concurrentist phenomenalism. It is this issue that I have 
attempted to address and propose a rejoinder on Berkeley’s behalf. It is not my purpose in 
this thesis to weigh Berkeley’s responses to the general problem of evil, attempts I deem 
sufficient and acceptable here. Thus, as a response to the aforementioned critique, a God 
that does not directly concur with human actions avoids the problem of divine moral 
culpability and as such, is morally superior to one that does.  
 




 HP, p. 82 
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The project of this thesis has been to bring forth the issue of moral culpability and 
examine how an incompatibilist account of freedom might work within Leibniz and 
Berkeley’s neo-theistic phenomenalisms. I have confronted Leibniz’s and Berkeley’s 
metaphysical pictures with the problems of human and divine moral culpability and 
propose manners in which their phenomenalist metaphysical systems may be reworked or 
tweaked in order to avoid these critiques. In my opinion, the free-will problem and 
problems of moral culpability pose serious threats to Leibniz and Berkeley’s philosophies 
since they address the very workings of the respective metaphysical systems and seek to 
undermine key components such as God and free-will.  
 
Working from an incompatibilist reading of Leibniz, I have argued that his theory 
of monads leaves no room for human agency since it does not allow one to fulfill the 
contingency requirement for freedom that Leibniz himself sets out. As such, I suggest 
that individuals who perform morally evil acts do not do so freely and as such, are not 
morally responsible for them. With regards to Berkeley, I have put forth that God concurs 
and is solely responsible for actualizing evil acts, something inconsistent with His divine 
attributes. And on this basis, while human beings are responsible for willing morally evil 
acts, God is also culpable because of the nature of Berkeleyan concurrentism.  
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I have suggested that Leibniz cannot have human agency which he desired, and 
Berkeley cannot consistently retain God in his metaphysical picture as these respective 
systems stand. Apart from a consistent, workable metaphysic, both would desire to 
maintain the idea that people alone are to be held morally accountable for the acts they 
commit. Human individuals possess free activity of their wills and they are thus 
responsible for the acts they perform. I have thus sought to dissolve these problems on 
behalf of these two philosophers. 
 
Human free-will, the theory of monads as well as his neo-theistic conception of 
God are both components of his metaphysical system that I find, Leibniz desires greatly 
to retain. In order to address the problem of free-will and human moral culpability, I have 
put forth the tweaked theory of monads. This alternative to Leibniz’s original theory of 
monads allows Leibniz to maintain the aforementioned tenets of his metaphysical system. 
However, such a move does require a re-formulation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
and Predicate-in-notion Principle.  
 
 In the case of Berkeley, I have put forth that the workings of the Berkeleyan 
world make it such that God actualizes or brings about acts of moral evil. To dissolve this 
critique and save his immaterialist world view, I argued that Berkeley should borrow 
from the immaterialist world view of Leibniz. The modified Berkeleyan metaphysical 
picture that I propose would essentially have God take on a different role from Berkeley’s 
original formulation. God would be present, but less intimately so. He would take on the 
 86 
role of a grand architect and law giver, relinquishing that of a moment to moment 
coordinator. It is this intimate presence that gives rise to the problem of divine moral 
culpability. As such, I find that the modified Berkeleyan metaphysical picture, one 
augmented with Leibniz’s theory of monads, sees his idealist world view just sufficiently 
altered that his overarching philosophy is not unrecognizable and yet have it avoid the 
aforementioned critique. Since God does not actualize or bring into fruition any acts 
including morally evil acts, then God is not morally culpable for moral evil. The spirit of 
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